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ABSTRACT 
One basic expectation that citizens have of government is to restore order in the face of 
devastation. With each catastrophic incident, politicians and administrators step under the 
public microscope, as they attempt to bring order out of chaos. Failure to perform such a 
basic governmental function subjects officials and agencies to immense scrutiny with 
personal and organizational repercussions. In the quest for the answers to “What can be 
done better next time?” and “How do we prevent this from happening again?” elected 
officials and bureaucrats seek various policies. A recent example of this is the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS is a fusion of Incident Command Systems 
(ICS) and broad governmental policy aimed at providing a systematic response to 
incidents. The fact that NIMS became policy was quite possibly a predictable event in an 
incremental series of events that began in the early 1970s. This thesis reveals how these 
predictable and incremental efforts have pushed our national frameworks into an 
increasing state of complexity with the potential of catastrophic failure. Further, this 
thesis recommends ways that will harvest success in the face of a catastrophic or 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In recent history, the United States of America has experienced a number of disasters and 
catastrophic incidents. In the wake of each of these events, government officials and 
citizens examine the response in an effort to determine “What can be done better next 
time?” and “How do we prevent this from happening again?” One basic expectation that 
citizens have of government is to provide public safety services and restore order in the 
face of devastation (Arceneaux & Stein, 2006, p. 44; NRF, 2008, p. 15). With each 
catastrophic incident, federal, state, and local politicians and administrators step under the 
public microscope, as they attempt to bring order out of chaos. Failure to perform such a 
basic governmental function in a satisfactory manner subjects officials and agencies to 
immense scrutiny with personal and organizational repercussions (Arceneaux & Stein, 
2006, p. 44). In the quest for the answer to these questions, both elected officials and 
bureaucrats seek various policies.  
A recent example of this is the National Incident Management System (NIMS). 
NIMS is a fusion of the Incident Command System (ICS) and broad governmental policy 
aimed at providing a systematic response to incidents. NIMS is an integral part of the 
National Response Framework (NRF), which specifies federal, state, local, and tribal 
responsibilities for all aspects of catastrophic incidents. NIMS and the NRF are the 
United States’ policy answers to the question of “What can be done better next time?” 
and “How do we prevent this from happening again?” 
The fact that NIMS became policy was quite possibly a predictable event in an 
incremental series of events that began in the early 1970s. This thesis reveals how these 
predictable and incremental efforts have pushed our national frameworks into an 
increasing state of complexity, a state that approaches the potential for a catastrophic 
failure with each quest for efficiency. Further, this thesis recommends ways that will 
harvest success in the face of a catastrophic or disastrous incident without increasing 
complexity. Rather, each recommendation is aimed at reducing complexity, as well as 
maintaining, and hopefully increasing, the acceptability of ICS and NIMS, to the end 
user—local responders.  
 xvi 
ICS refers to itself as a “top down” system of management where objectives are 
orchestrated by a traditional, scalar command structure (NIMS, 2008). This thesis will 
show that incident success is more likely when command personnel acknowledge the 
“bottom-up,” or self-organizing system that naturally occurs during the initial stages. 
Once commanders acknowledge this portion of the response, they can take it into account 
as part of their planning for the sustained response. It is the IC/UC’s job to support these 
efforts while developing an action plan for a sustained response. Further, the thesis will 
show how this bottom-up response is the natural state for first responders, and that it fits 
current ICS conventions.  
This thesis equates the combined concepts of individuality and locality to 
flexibility and adaptability. It examines the need for these concepts as a tenant of ICS and 
NIMS. Earlier ICS manuals emphasized the need for flexibility in implementation; 
however, more recent NIMS documents do not share this emphasis (ICS, 1988); (NIMS, 
2008). The 2008 version of the NRF states that “Incidents start local and end local.” The 
NRF emphasizes flexibility in many areas of the text, suggesting more of a framework 
for incident management than a procedure. This research suggests that there is a 
disconnect in the intent of incident management as a whole, and the current ethos and 
teachings surrounding ICS and NIMS.  
This document also examines the concept of inclusiveness when establishing a 
UC. One of the weaknesses of ICS in years past was that it was construed as a fire service 
system (Cole 2000, p. 209–210) (Hannestad 2005, p. 23). With the implementation of 
NIMS and All-Hazard ICS, the pendulum has swung far to the side of inclusiveness in 
UC. This is significant because it directly affects the implementation of a UC or an EOC, 
and hence, affects the success of ICS. Simply put, our light, simple, and agile commands 
are becoming committees and bureaucracies. As put by Drucker: 
One hears a great deal today about "the end of hierarchy."  This is blatant 
nonsense….In a situation of common peril--And every institution is likely 
to encounter it sooner or later--survival of all depends on clear command. 
If the ship goes down, the captain does not call a meeting, the captain 
gives an order. And if the ship is to be saved, everyone must obey the 
order, must know exactly where to go and what to do…. "Hierarchy," and 
the unquestioning acceptance of it by everyone in the organization, is the 
only hope in a crisis. (Drucker, 1999, p. 11) 
 xvii 
This research explores where the management failures lie between what obviously 
works and what does not. The questions go beyond the media presented perspective and 
focus on policy level realities that are missed under the often politically charged and 
sensationally focused bright lights of 24-hour news reporting. The importance of the 
research is measured in human life. If lives can be saved through identifying a 
management difference, then changes can be made to improve response. Finding that 
important seam is the ultimate goal of both this research and response leaders across the 
country.  
The research works at the strategic policy level to identify how systemic rather 
than tactical alterations can be made across the system in an effort to improve overall 
management. In particular, it considers the response phase of disasters and catastrophic 
incidents and asks, what can be done to help responders use the existing framework? 
What positive change can be made in the national ethos with regard to disaster and 
catastrophic incident management? And finally, what can be done to improve the 
acceptance and utility of known and proven management tools? 
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PREFACE 
This is a meager attempt by a practitioner to put some of our recent advancements 
in incident management into perspective. I am by no means a salty dog when it comes to 
incident management, and I am not the best firefighter who ever laid his hands on a hose 
(at times, it seems that the show dogs make all the good incidents while I sit on the 
porch). I watch in awe every shift as the youth in my organization perform heroic acts 
and provide service above and beyond the call in a manner that exudes professionalism 
and excellence. They have picked up and are carrying the torch for all of us. They 
perform steadily in the complex environment that we have created with our incremental 
contributions.  
When one of my Cohorts found out my thesis topic, he looked at me, and in a 
defeatist tone, said, “So your taking on ICS.”  I do not remember my exact answer at that 
early point, but it was pretty wishy-washy. My clear answer now would be “No, I am not 
taking on ICS. I am taking on a mentality.” This mentality is the mentality that over-
simplifies ICS by putting it in a pretty package. It is a mentality that says a person can be 
an “All-Hazard” incident manager in a complex disaster or catastrophic incident 
environment by checking the boxes. It is a mentality that says attending classes, getting 
task books approved, and following the instructions in the Field Operations Guide gives 
one the credentials to be part of an Incident Management Team. It is the mentality that 
would exclude the everyday practitioner, and true expert, from a command position 
because he/she has not gotten all of his or her boxes checked. That day is coming.  
In all, I feel we are losing our place as discipline-specific experts to mediocre 
generalists who know how to fill out ICS forms and follow checklists. Further, it is a 
developing mentality that seemingly forgets that we, as incident managers are working 
for two groups—citizens, and the boots on the ground. It is our job to save lives and 
property. It is also our job, as incident managers, to support and provide for the safety of 
responders. It is our job to help them be successful, not to “command” them. Subordinate 
to this, we are bound to please our superiors, our politicians and bureaucrats, and our 
peers—when we can (Lord knows I have got the hackles up on a few folks in those three 
 xxiv 
groups from time to time. I think there may be a county I’m not supposed to go back to 
somewhere…). It is my opinion that we must remember who we are serving. 
As we transition to the nuevo “All-Hazard” mentality, we are losing the real art of 
incident management—the parts of ICS that we really should be passing on. Experienced 
ICS users will be familiar with these areas. Simply put, if the world is falling down 
around your ears and your first instinct is to whip out the ICS forms and spout ICS and 
NIMS rules—we have got a problem.  
In this thesis, I address three issues that I see as key to advancing our ability as a 
nation to respond to the big (and little) ones. I do not propose that these three policy 
options are all-inclusive, as there are many more areas that could be addressed. 
Throughout, I maintain that the management failures we see over and over again are not 
the fault of NIMS, ICS, NRF, NRP, FRP, or any other system revision. It is not radio 
interoperability. It is us—we are the problem! We, as a nation, have tendered the right 
solution to the wrong problem. In doing so, we are getting farther away from some things 
that work right. The first area is our ethos in the initial stages of an incident or disaster. 
Second, is the recognition of the need for flexibility in implementation of ICS and NIMS. 
Third, I suggest that we have developed an atmosphere of over-inclusiveness in recent 
times when it comes to UC.  
Some ideas may come across in a more critical or negative light than intended. I 
truly hope they do not. When one takes a critical look at a topic—someone else is going 
to get their feathers ruffled. When I first started working on this thesis, I was, at times, 
tagged as a NIMS and ICS opponent (in reality, it wouldn’t matter if I was…Andy 
who?). If folks would sit next to me in my real job, they would see that ICS and NIMS 
are our way of doing business. I am a huge fan of ICS and NIMS. In my twenty-plus year 
career, I have known nothing else but ICS when it comes to managing incidents. (…and 
may I assert, I would prefer not to be “in-charge” of much. I have found that being “in-
charge” is the equivalent of putting a target on one’s back and sitting down on a hay bale 
at the shooting range.)  
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Thank you for taking the time to read my thesis that was submitted in the final 
















-The task for those who care about emergency response is to understand 
what makes ICS succeed and under what circumstances. –Donald 
Moynihan 
-If every incident had a fence around it, a pre-incident briefing, and a 
starting gun – this would be easy!  –Anonymous 
At 9:02 a.m. on Wednesday, April 19, 1995, a small group of domestic terrorists 
detonated a Ryder truck filled with the commonly used explosive, ammonium nitrate and 
fuel oil, on NW 5th Street in front of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma (OKC, 1996, p. 9). The resultant blast sheared the front face off of the 
nine-story building and substantially cut into the center of the building (OKC, 1996, p. 2, 
9). Oklahoma City responded in an effort that has been heralded in the years since 
(Keating, 2005). Approximately one year prior, Fire Chief Gary Marrs and many key 
personnel from the city attended a course in incident management at the National Fire 
Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland (OKC, 1996, p. 1). They understood the key 
positions and concepts needed to mitigate the incident (OKC, 1996, p. 1). Assistant Chief 
Jon Hansen became the face of Oklahoma City’s valiant response (OKC, 1996, p. 29–
30). From the start, Oklahoma City controlled the incident and the image of the incident 
(OKC, 1996, p. 25–34). 
At 8:46 a.m. on September 11, 2001, American Airlines Flight 11, guided by five 
al-Qaeda hijackers, struck the North Tower of the World Trade Center (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 1–14). In the minutes and hours that followed, 
three more terrorist incidents ensued: United Airlines Flight 175 struck the South Tower 
of the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77 struck the Pentagon 
at 9:37 a.m., and United Airlines Flight 93 crashed into a field near Shanksville, 
Pennsylvania, at 10:03 a.m. (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 1–14). 
The events of this day changed the focus of a nation. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, 
President George W. Bush formed the Office of Homeland Security and announced the  
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Global War on Terror (OHS, 2002). The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States (9/11 Commission) was formed to investigate and report on these 
incidents (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. xv–xvii).  
The Commission’s report identified successes and failures on the part of many 
governmental organizations. The city of New York was lauded for the heroic and life-
saving efforts by its fire department, police department, and the Port Authority. Mayor 
Rudolph Giuliani rose to the occasion and became known as “America’s Mayor” for his 
leadership during the events (Economist, 2005). The city of New York, which had 
received such praises, was also called out for their lack of coordination between agencies 
and their lack of interoperability (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 
317–323). These were cited in the failure to make evacuation announcements that might 
have saved the lives of many of the 343 New York City Firefighters, 37 Port Authority 
Police Officers, and 23 New York City Police Officers that perished that day (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 317–323). The Arlington, Virginia, and the 
Washington, D.C. fire departments were commended for their use of the ICS (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 314). Several government organizations came 
to light for their failures. Two of the most notable, the FBI and the CIA, underwent 
significant changes (Bi-Partisan Policy Center, 2011, p. 12).  
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in New Orleans1 (White 
House, 2006, p. 33). Days prior, officials were warned of Katrina’s devastating potential 
(White House, 2006, p. 23–31). In the months and years preceding, both local and federal 
officials, knew of the Achilles’ heel in New Orleans, the levees (White House, 2006, p. 
24–25). During the days of August 27 through 29, officials embarked on a massive 
attempt to evacuate New Orleans (White House, 2006, p. 25). They issued a voluntary 
evacuation order, and they implemented a plan that made all lanes of the major 
highways2 leading to the city go only one direction—away from the city (White House, 
                                                 
1 Hurricane Katrina made landfall on over ninety miles of coastline in Louisiana and Mississippi. This 
discussion focuses on New Orleans. 
2 Referred to as “contra-flow” plans. 
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2006, p. 25) (Comfort, 2007, p. 190). Roughly 92 percent of New Orleans evacuated 
(White House, 2006, p. 29). By many standards, this would be an incredible feat. The  
8 percent of New Orleans’s population left in the city were substantially the poorest and 
in the most vulnerable areas (Comfort, 2007, p. 191) (White House, 2006, p. 29; Harrald, 
2006, p. 258). The consequences were devastating and well known. In the aftermath, 
Michal D. Brown’s3 actions and credentials immediately came under scrutiny. Secretary 
Chertoff relieved him of his position as Principal Federal Official over the Hurricane 
Katrina Response (White House, 2006, p. 47) (Quarantelli, 2005). Brown resigned his 
position with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on September 12, 
2005 (FEMA, 2005).  
Leadership (or lack thereof?) on the part of officials in Louisiana and New 
Orleans became national news. During the days after landfall, emergency managers had 
to be taught how to manage this type of event (United States Senate, 2006, p. 562). Basic 
local, state, and federal preparations, such as communications, transportation, food, and 
shelter became the target of criticism (United States House, 2006). For all intents and 
purposes, the media controlled the image of the response to Hurricane Katrina in New 
Orleans (United States House, 2006; Harrald, 2006, p. 258); (Quarantelli, 2005). Mayor 
Ray Nagin actually resorted to using the media as a venue to plead for federal assistance 
(CNN, 2005). The federal, state, and local governments were uncoordinated (United 
States House, 2006). Reports of chaos at the Superdome and Convention Center, 
lawlessness by police officers, and people stranded on bridges and rooftops in the 
sweltering heat were pervasive in the media (United States House, 2006). These images 
added to the vision of leadership unprepared and unable to handle the disaster. Despite all 
of the heroic and competent efforts across Louisiana and Mississippi, the situation in 
New Orleans overshadowed the response. 
The incidents described above consisted of one natural disaster and two terrorist 
incidents (one by domestic actors and one by foreign nationals). All were similar in that 
they were nationally significant incidents. All were thought to be unprecedented in recent 
                                                 
3 Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency at the time of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall. 
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history. Local, state, and federal governments had the opportunity to prepare for these 
disasters and the opportunity to manage them. In the case of the Oklahoma City bombing, 
agencies enjoyed a positive image. In the case of the 9/11 attack on the World Trade 
Center, individuals were heralded for their leadership and heroism while organizations, 
such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency, were 
subject to immense scrutiny. The events of 9/11 were summed up by the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States as “a failure of imagination” 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 339). The response to Hurricane 
Katrina had devastating effects on personal careers and the image of organizations. The 
response effort was summed up in a similarly titled United States House of 
Representative’s investigation as “a failure of initiative (United States House, 2006).” 
In recent history, the United States of America has experienced a number of 
disasters and catastrophic incidents. In the wake of each of these events, government 
officials and citizens examine the response in an effort to determine “What can be done 
better next time?” and “How do we prevent this from happening again?” One basic 
expectation that citizens have of government is to provide public safety services and 
restore order in the face of devastation (Arceneaux & Stein, 2006, p. 44; (NRF, 2008, p. 
15). With each catastrophic incident, federal, state, and local politicians and 
administrators step under the public microscope as they attempt to bring order out of 
chaos. Failure to perform such a basic governmental function in a satisfactory manner 
subjects officials and agencies to immense scrutiny with personal and organizational 
repercussions (Arceneaux & Stein, 2006, p. 44). In the quest for the answer to these 
questions, both elected officials and bureaucrats seek various policies. A recent example 
of this is the National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS is a fusion of the 
Incident Command System (ICS) and broad governmental policy aimed at providing a 
systematic response to incidents. NIMS is an integral part of the National Response 
Framework (NRF), which specifies federal, state, local, and tribal responsibilities for all 
aspects of catastrophic incidents. NIMS and the National Response Framework (NRF) 
are the United States’ policy answers to the question of “What can be done better next 
time?” and “How do we prevent this from happening again?” 
 5 
The fact that NIMS became policy was quite possibly a predictable event in an 
incremental series of events that began in the early 1970s. The answer to “why?” this 
occurred may lie in complexity theory. Further, complexity theory may also explain why 
the United States is setting itself up for a catastrophic failure with NIMS. In a recent 
conversation (2011) with a highly respected homeland security professional, the author 
and he were discussing NIMS as a policy. As the conversation ensued, this gentleman 
looked over at the author and stated “there has never been a successful implementation of 
NIMS.” To ponder that eight years after the effective date of a policy that it basically has 
not worked is striking to the author.  
This thesis reveals how these predictable and incremental efforts have pushed our 
national frameworks into an increasing state of complexity, a state that approaches the 
potential for a catastrophic failure with each quest for efficiency. Further, this thesis 
recommends ways that will harvest success in the face of a catastrophic or disastrous 
incident without increasing complexity. Rather, each recommendation is aimed at 
reducing complexity, as well as maintaining, and hopefully increasing, the acceptability 
of ICS and NIMS, to the end user—local responders.  
ICS refers to itself as a “top down” system of management where objectives are 
orchestrated by a traditional, scalar command structure (NIMS, 2008). This thesis will 
show that incident success is more likely when command personnel acknowledge the 
“bottom-up,” or self-organizing system that naturally occurs during the initial stages. 
Once commanders acknowledge this portion of the response, they can take it into account 
as part of their planning for the sustained response. It is the IC/UCs’ job to support these 
efforts while developing an action plan for a sustained response. Further, the thesis will 
show how this bottom up response is the natural state for first responders and that it fits 
current ICS conventions. Consideration of the first recommendation lends itself to the 
second, flexibility. 
The first and second recommendations are mutually exclusive; however, they are 
closely related. When one considers that a network of responders has the ability to self-
organize into an effective initial effort, one must also consider that their effort considers 
the individuality and locality of the situation. Such a network is adaptable and flexible in 
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a way that a “top-down” organization cannot be (Harrald, 2006, p. 270). This thesis 
equates the combined concepts of individuality and locality to flexibility and adaptability. 
It examines the need for these concepts as a tenant of ICS and NIMS. Earlier ICS 
manuals emphasized the need for flexibility in implementation; however, more recent 
NIMS documents do not share this emphasis (ICS, 1988; NIMS, 2008). The 2008 version 
of the NRF states that “Incidents start local and end local.” The NRF emphasizes 
flexibility in many areas of the text, suggesting more of a framework for incident 
management than a procedure. This thesis suggests there is a disconnect in the intent of 
incident management as a whole, and the current ethos and teachings surrounding ICS 
and NIMS.  
This document also examines the concept of inclusiveness when establishing a 
UC. One of the weaknesses of ICS in years past was that it was construed as a fire service 
system (Cole 2000, pp. 209–210); (Hannestad 2005, p. 23). In many cases, it became an 
issue when the main players, fire, law enforcement, and EMS were not working together. 
Pertinent to this thesis is the concept that the pendulum has swung far to the side of 
inclusiveness in UC. This is significant because it directly affects the implementation of a 
UC or an EOC, and hence, affects the success of ICS. Simply put, our light, simple, and 
agile commands are becoming committees and bureaucracies. As put by Drucker: 
One hears a great deal today about “the end of hierarchy.”  This is blatant 
nonsense….In a situation of common peril--And every institution is likely 
to encounter it sooner or later--survival of all depends on clear command. 
If the ship goes down, the captain does not call a meeting, the captain 
gives an order. And if the ship is to be saved, everyone must obey the 
order, must know exactly where to go and what to do…. "Hierarchy," and 
the unquestioning acceptance of it by everyone in the organization, is the 
only hope in a crisis. (Drucker, 1999, p. 11) 
In choosing the title for this thesis, the author sorted through many concepts that 
are important to the conversation at hand. One key concept that kept rising to the top is 
that in this massive NIMS effort our nation’s response frameworks have moved to an 
increasingly complex state that is nearing the point of catastrophic failure. NIMS is one 
example of an outgrowth of complexity—a normal accident in an increasingly complex 
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system4. Subsequently, we are missing the overarching point of all of this—the ability of 
a local group of responders to quickly assess an otherwise out of control situation, 
identify the resources needed, and develop an organization or organizations that fit the 
needs of their situation. They need to be able to do this in some sort of standard manner, 
so that when others come to help, they can quickly fit into the system. This is the concept 
that serves the real stakeholders—the citizens of the United States of America. When the 
sky falls in their back yard, they do not care about the reimbursement and use of proper 
forms that is the job of some bureaucrat to figure out later. They do not care about 
whether the police or fire department is in charge, or any of the other antics and 
positioning that have gone on for years. They want and need an organization that puts an 
ambulance, fire truck, police car, or other emergency responder in front of their house—
fast. They want stabilization, security, safe refuge, and food. They care about who is 
going to help those poor people on the TV screen. 
J. Patrick Wright published a book in 1979 written by a gentleman named John Z. 
DeLorean. DeLorean, a no less than controversial figure, detailed his experiences as a 
rising star in the General Motors Corporation. His book brought forth many stories and 
examples of how the automotive giant fell from greatness. Ultimately, Mr. DeLorean felt 
that the top management at GM had lost sight of its customers and became clouded in an 
aura of organizational bliss. Mr. DeLorean’s work was entitled, On a Clear Day You can 
See General Motors. Arguably, many of the portions of this book parallel the current 
state of ICS and NIMS.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In recent history, disasters and catastrophic incidents have yielded mixed results 
when it comes to judging them a management success or failure. In the wake of each of 
these events, government officials and citizens examine the response in an effort to 
determine “What can be done better next time?” and “How do we prevent this from 
happening again?” After the tragic events of September, 11, 2001, one of the answers to 
these questions was a national incident management system. Homeland Security 
                                                 
4 The concept of “normal accident” by Charles Perrow is expounded upon in Literature Review. 
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Presidential Direcitve-5, issued in 2003, created NIMS. NIMS has five components. One 
of the components, the Command and Management Component, makes ICS a mandatory 
system for responding to incidents in the United States.  
Responders, administrators, and academics alike, question the efficacy of the ICS 
to be the one-size-fits-all system for incident management. Since ICS has become 
mandatory, many agencies have “checked the boxes” and done what is required to be 
“NIMS compliant” (Jensen, 2009, pp. 22–23). However, many have only done what is 
required in an effort to be eligible for grant funding. In reality, they have not incorporated 
NIMS and ICS as part of their everyday operations (Jensen, 2009, p. 22). As there has 
been push back and resistance, there has been increasing emphasis and revision to the 
system on the part of the federal and state governments. Hence, as the system has become 
more complex, the chances of success from using the systems are decreasing.  
This thesis examines ICS as a policy and examines three areas that can potentially 
improve the chances that local responders will use ICS. The intent is to do this without 
adding regulations and increasing system complexity. The goal is to prevent the 
consequences of management failures that can occur from disasters and catastrophic 
incidents. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In light of the successes and failures in incident management discussed above, 
this research explores where the management failures lie between what obviously works 
and what does not. The questions go beyond the media presented perspective and focus 
on policy level realities that are missed under the often politically charged and 
sensationally focused bright lights of 24-hour news reporting. The importance of the 
research is measured in human life. If lives can be saved through identifying a 
management difference, then changes can be made to improve response. Finding that 
important seam is the ultimate goal of both this research and response leaders across the 
country.  
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The research works at the strategic policy level to identify how systemic rather 
than tactical alterations can be made across the system in an effort to improve overall 
management. In particular, it considers the response phase of disasters and catastrophic 
incidents and asks, what can be done to help responders use the existing framework? 
What positive change can be made in the national ethos with regard to disaster and 
catastrophic incident management? And finally, what can be done to improve the 
acceptance and utility of known and proven management tools? 
D. HYPOTHESIS 
This research posits a hypothesis that there is a correlation between management 
failures in disasters and unwillingness or an inability on the part of managers to take 
advantage of strategic frameworks for success, which are often contained in the ICS 
(ICS). Underlying this hypothesis are several contributing factors.5 The first is a failure 
on the part of administrators, educators, and responders to recognize the differences in 
the management approach needed in the initial stages of a disaster as opposed to the 
traditional top-down model of managing the sustained response to long-term incidents. 
Second, it contends that the adoption of ICS as part of NIMS has exacerbated this 
unwillingness through a real or perceived loss of local autonomy and flexibility. Third, 
the thesis suggests that in the transition to All-Hazard ICS, there has developed an 
atmosphere of over-inclusiveness regarding members of the UC. 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Incidents at the national level are closely scrutinized, and mistakes and errors will 
be exposed. Where those management failures are linked to losses of life, demands will 
be made against both the failed managers and agencies, by other levels of government, 
citizen groups or even the courts. While some management failures are going to happen, 
those that can be changed through better policy should be critically considered and 
changed. Management is not a new subject and managing catastrophic incidents is a field 
of study that can be known through analysis.  
                                                 
5 The author acknowledges that this is not (and cannot be) an all inclusive list. 
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Much debate surrounds the efficacy of ICS and NIMS to handle a comprehensive 
range of incidents. This thesis will not only contribute concrete solutions to improve the 
use of ICS, but it will also add to the academic literature on the topic. This research is an 
effort to apply appropriate analysis to three aspects of a current policy, NIMS, in an 
attempt to reduce complexity and increase understanding. It also uses a policy analysis to 
develop strategic recommendations aimed at increasing 1) the utility of ICS to the 
homeland security enterprise, and 2) its palatability to local jurisdictions. The goal is to 
prevent the consequences of management failures that can occur from disasters and 
catastrophic incidents. 
F. METHODOLOGY: POLICY ANALYSIS 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 made this charge to the Secretary of 
Homeland Security:  
Beginning in Fiscal Year 2005, Federal departments and agencies shall 
make adoption of the NIMS a requirement, to the extent permitted by law, 
for providing Federal preparedness assistance through grants, contracts, or 
other activities. The Secretary shall develop standards and guidelines for 
determining whether a State or local entity has adopted the NIMS.  
With that, ICS became part of United States policy. The thesis uses a policy 
analysis to develop strategic recommendations aimed at increasing 1) the utility of ICS to 
the homeland security enterprise, and 2) its palatability to local jurisdictions. It asks the 
question, what can be done to help responders use the existing framework? What positive 
change can be made in the national ethos with regard to disaster and catastrophic incident 
management? And finally, what can be done to improve the acceptance and utility of 
known and proven management tools? 
Policy analysis is a research methodology designed “to evaluate either existing or 
potential policies in terms of their ability (or potential ability) to achieve the stated policy 
goals (Morag & Wollman, 2008).” The goal is to improve an existing policy. As opposed 
to academic research, which often has the goal of advancing knowledge, policy analysis 
focuses on solving “concrete” policy issues. The policy analysis methodology allows the 
researcher to consider a range of variables and determine the strengths and weaknesses of 
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the existing policy. Then, recommendations are considered through a lens that considers 
the political, organizational, budgetary, and legal environments in which the policy must 
exist. Recommendations for improvement are analyzed and their trade-offs are 
considered (Morag & Wollman, 2008). 
The policy analysis methodology revolves around an analyst performing a cost-
benefit analysis for a set of recommendations developed through research. The cost-
benefit analysis may or may not be based on monetary benefits or costs. Further, the 
analysis may consider multiple goals in the cost-benefit analysis. This thesis uses a 
qualitative cost-benefit analysis that looks “at potential impacts of policy modifications 
or new policies. However, unlike the monetary cost-benefit analysis, the qualitative cost-
benefit analysis attempts to assign values to qualitative factors, such as ethics, political 
acceptability and the like” (Morag & Wollman, 2008).  
Bardach, 2009, outlines an eight-step process for conducting a policy analysis. In 
his book, A practical guide for policy analysis: The eightfold path to more effective 
problem solving, he primarily examines public policy analysis. The steps, or “eightfold 
path,” are: 
1. Define the Problem 
2. Assemble Some Evidence 
3. Construct the Alternatives 
4. Select the Criteria 
5. Project the Outcomes 
6. Confront the Tradeoffs 
7. Decide 
8. Tell Your Story (Bardach, 2009, p. 8) 
The definition of a problem or issue is the guide to the rest of the policy analysis. 
It is critical in diagnosing the issues or conditions that are the underlying causes of 
problems (Bardach, 2009, pp. 144–146, 195–196). In this thesis, the problem is defined 
in the Problem Statement Section and is expounded upon in the Introduction and 
Research Questions Section. Assembling the evidence involves researching a variety of 
sources to determine the nature and extent of the issue, assess the particular features of 
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the concrete policy situation, and identify policies that have worked effectively in similar 
situations. (Bardach, 2009, pp. 253–258). Research in the Literature Review Section 
involved consulting NIMS and ICS source documentation, as well as a variety of 
supporting academic references.  
Once he or she commences research, the researcher begins to identify policy 
alternatives. Each policy alternative, or policy option, has its own chapter in this thesis. 
The Analysis Chapter evaluates each policy against a set of criteria. The analyst selects 
the criteria based on the intended outcomes of the particular policy (Bardach, 2009, pp. 
442–443). Some commonly used criteria are efficiency, effectiveness, cost, process, 
legality, political acceptability, robustness, and improvability (Bardach, 2009, pp. 448–
537). The criteria used in this thesis are as follows6: 1) effectiveness, 2) end-user 
acceptability, 3) complexity, 4) political acceptability, 5) cost. 
An outcomes matrix is a common method of evaluating alternatives against their 
criteria7 (Bardach, 2009, p. 700). From the matrix, the analyst is able to compare the 
strengths and weaknesses of each alternative as well as begin to project the outcomes. 
Projecting outcomes is a strategic forecast of the future of each alternative. In this step, 
the analyst must also consider emergent features, unintended consequences, and 
undesirable effects of each alternative (Bardach, 2009, pp. 666–681). When compared to 
other alternatives, each alternative may involve trade-offs (Bardach, 2009, pp. 424–425). 
Where one alternative may be rich in effectiveness and high in cost, another alternative 
may be lower in cost and effective enough to accomplish the stated goals. Once the 
alternatives have been evaluated, one or more alternatives may be selected. In some 
cases, the recommendations may not be mutually exclusive, rather they are recommended 
in the context of their strengths and weaknesses as individual alternatives (Bardach, 2009, 
pp. 306–308). The Conclusion Chapter of this thesis identifies recommendations based 
on the definition of the problem, research, and analysis. 
                                                 
6 See Chapter VI—Analysis for an explanation of each of these criteria. 
7 The outcomes matrix for this thesis is located in Chapter VI—Analysis. 
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As a process, the policy analysis methodology is iterative. The problem is defined 
and redefined. Alternatives are conceptualized and reconceptualized. Criteria are revised. 
Projections are reassessed, and trade-offs are re-evaluated. Once this has been completed 
satisfactorily, the analyst “tells the story” (Bardach, 2009, pp. 796–797). In this case, the 
“story” is a thesis. In other arenas, it could be a presentation or a journal article. The 
intent is to convey the message in a format which will be robust enough to carry the 
author’s intent through the implementation process8 (Bardach, 2009, pp. 539–540).  
Policy analysis is a methodology aimed at generating concrete solutions for 
existing policies that are not working or are not working well. There is no guarantee of 
success. The recommendations posited by this thesis have considered a range of variables 
and consulted many sources. In this thesis, the use of ICS as a component of NIMS is 
examined. The goal is to prevent the consequences of management failures that can occur 
in disasters and catastrophic incidents. 
                                                 
8 An author would be remiss in failing to acknowledge the uncertainty that exists in any policy 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. ICS AND NIMS 
Multi-agency and multi-jurisdiction incidents were a driving force behind the 
development and adoption of ICS and NIMS. ICS was born out of a need realized after 
the 1970 wildfire season in southern California (NFA, 1988, p. ix; Hannestad, 2005, p. 
19); (Moynihan, 2007, p. 6). This wildfire season was especially significant and 
demanded resources from a vast area. Responders experienced exceptional difficulty in 
coordinating the resources. Anecdotal stories surfaced, such as fire apparatus passing 
each other on the way to fires at opposite ends of an expansive area (Cole, 2007, p. 209). 
Another common story is that of responders who called for a “tanker,” meaning a truck,9 
which carries a large amount of water, actually received a “tanker,” a plane that drops 
water and retardant from the air. Agencies identified several areas that were lacking and 
could be incorporated into a system. Situations had too many people reporting to one 
supervisor. Response agencies had incompatible organizational structures. There was no 
standardized way of communicating information about the incident, and when they 
needed to communicate, they had incompatible communication systems. Agencies were 
not coordinating their planning and operations, and they had difficulty in determining 
lines of authority. Further, there was a lack of incident action planning and back-up 
planning (Molino, 2006, p. 8). 
Seven fire agencies banded together in an organization called the Firefighting 
Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies (FIRESCOPE10) 
(Cole, 2000, pp. 207–210). The organization was chartered by the United States Congress 
in 1972 and charged with developing a model system (Cole, 2000, p. 206). The system 
was to be a framework for multi-agency coordination of complex emergencies that 
exceeded the capabilities of any single jurisdiction (FEMA, 1987 in Cole, 2000, p. 207). 
                                                 
9 The proper name for the truck in this case is “tender.” 
10 The history of FIRESCOPE and development of ICS has been summarized at length in many 
sources. A very short description is included here as context. Sources recommended by this author for 
further information on the development of ICS are NWCG, 1994; Cole, 2000; and Hannestad, 2005.  
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Within a matter of years, it became evident to practitioners that the model developed by 
FIRESCOPE Coalition could work for other types of emergency incidents (Hannestad, 
2005, pp. 19–20; Cole, 2000, p. 207). By 1982, the system was spreading across the 
nation primarily by grassroots, or peer-driven, methods (Hannestad, 2005, pp. 19–20). 
The National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland, began teaching the system as a 
nation-wide system in 1983 (Cole, 2000, p. 209). Although there was some participation 
from other first response agencies, prior to 9/11, ICS was primarily a fire service tool 
(Cole, 2000, pp. 209–210); (Jensen, 2010, pp. 18–19); (Hannestad, 2005, p. 19). 
Certainly, it was not a nationwide phenomenon, as it is today. The fire service was the 
first discipline to embrace ICS, followed by local emergency managers and many law 
enforcement agencies (Hannestad, 2005, pp. 19–20; Cole, 2000, pp. 209–210).  
In response to the tremendous numbers of firefighter deaths and injuries each 
year, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) issued the first edition of NFPA 
1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Health and Safety Programs in 1987. 
(NFPA, 1987). NFPA 1500 recommendations stimulated sweeping safety changes in the 
fire service. Among these changes was the use of an incident management system for all 
incidents (NFPA, 1987). ICS was the system of choice for many agencies. Other agencies 
used a similar system developed by Chief Alan Brunacini from Phoenix, Arizona. 
Brunacini’s system was called the Fire Ground Commander (FGC) (Brunacini, 1985). 
Chief Brunacini was actually one of the members of the original NFPA 1500 committee 
(NFPA 1987); (Brunacini, 1985). He was a champion of safety and incident management. 
In developing his system, it was not his intent to undermine ICS; rather, he did what 
worked for his region.11 This is noted here because it ties to the need for flexibility, 
which is discussed later in this literature review. Phoenix Fire Department and Chief 
Brunacini became famous in the fire discipline and beyond for their progressive ways. 
For many years, ICS and FGC purists argued the compatibility of the systems. At one 
point, prior to the issue of NIMS, there was a compromise that was actually called the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS). That version of NIMS was a product of 
                                                 
11 The author knew Chief Brunacini during the early 1990s and heard him speak on several occasions. 
Further, the author was a member of the NFPA Occupational Medical and Health and then the NFPA 
Occupational Health and Safety Committees during the years of 1997 through 2004. 
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the National Fire Incident Management System Consortium. In informal circles, it was 
referred to as one-eyed NIMS.12 What is pertinent to this thesis is that even though there 
were some differences in these systems, as well as some of the other systems along the 
way, the differences were often semantics and/or areas that could be worked around. A 
later standard, NFPA 1561, specified minimum requirements for an incident management 
system in an effort to ensure compatibility across systems (NFPA 1561). 
After the events of 9/11, HSPD-5 put an end to any debate where incident 
management system would be used in the United States. NIMS, and subsequently ICS, 
became the law of the land. NIMS is a document composed of five components: 
Preparedness, Communications and Information Management, Resource Management, 
Command and Management, and Ongoing Management and Maintenance. ICS is one of 
the three components that comprise the Command and Management portion of NIMS. 
When more than one agency or jurisdiction must come together to solve an incident, the 
UC model of ICS is the command and management framework that the United States has 
chosen to use (NIMS, 2008).  
B. ICS IMPLEMENTATION 
The purpose of NIMS is to provide a standardized model for major incidents 
(Jensen, 2008, p. 1); (NIMS, 2008); (Christen, et al., 2001, p. 1). Implementation is a key 
issue in the context of this thesis, both in the context of implementing a program and in 
the context of applying the system as intended during an incident. When Hurricane 
Katrina struck in New Orleans, the local jurisdiction was not prepared to use ICS or 
NIMS (United States Senate, 2006, p. 562). Further, the state and federal response was 
not coordinated, nor was it conducted as specified in NIMS. This research questions the 
relationship between these failures and the implementation of the various management 
systems employed.  
There are several issues with acceptance of NIMS and subsequently, ICS. Among 
these are its fire service history, the federal push-down, and the “it does not apply to us” 
                                                 
12 As opposed to “two-eyed” NIIMS—the National Interagency Incident Management System or one 
of the NWCG’s original terms for ICS. 
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mentality (Cole, 2000, pp. 209–210; Jensen, 2010, pp. 18–19). The fire service history 
presents challenges to other disciplines in the management of national level emergencies 
(Hannestad, 2005, p. 19; Cole, 2000, pp. 209–210). The critique is not without merit. 
Disciplines bring their histories and culture to the effort, and ICS training adapted to help 
bridge this interdisciplinary gap (Decker, 2011, p. 228.). With the issuance of Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive-513 (HPSD-5), and Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-8 (HPSD-8), NIMS, and subsequently ICS, have taken on an “all-hazard” 
focus. With the all-hazard focus, there has been an effort to involve all of the interests, 
such as law enforcement, emergency medical services, and public health.14 One common 
example of the change in mentality is in the delivery of ICS-300 (Intermediate ICS) and 
ICS-400 (Advanced ICS) courses. These courses are scenario-based involving a variety 
of hazards, from floods to public health emergencies. Course instructors/administrators 
are expected to fill courses with members from a variety of organizations (CDP, 2010). 
The intent is to build networks, as well as provide a variety of perspectives (CDP, 2010). 
This multi-disciplinary approach is an effective method of moving beyond the fire service 
focus of early ICS efforts, and it is part of an effort often referred to by ICS practitioners 
as “de-smoking.” Despite these efforts, Decker indicates that some hurdles to the 
implementation of ICS include workplace cultural issues and employee and management 
values, attitudes, and motivation (Decker, 2011, p. 227). 
A second issue with acceptance has been the way in which NIMS was mandated. 
A presidential directive, HSPD-5, mandated the system at a time when the country was 
sensitive to the 9/11 attacks. This precluded massive resistance and made national 
discourse on the subject difficult (Jensen, 2010, p. 96). Following the events of 9/11, 
emotions ran high. Policies such as NIMS and the Patriot Act were able to be 
implemented without tremendous resistance, presumably due to the fear of another attack 
(Leifeld 2007, pp. 106–107; Jensen, 2010, p. 96). These types of policies may never have 
been accepted in a pre-9/11 world (Hamm, 2004).  
                                                 
13 HSPD-5 required the establishment of a national incident management system and HSPD-8 
established an all-hazard national preparedness goal. 
14 This is not intended to be an all-inclusive list. 
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Practitioners began to understand what HSPD-5 and HSPD-8 meant for their 
organization. Many organizations question the applicability of ICS to their jurisdiction. 
Jensen studied this at the county emergency management level. She discovered that many 
at the county level see the All-Hazard ICS as a direct copy of a fire-based system; and 
therefore, only parts of the system are applicable to areas such as counties and rural 
jurisdictions (Jensen, 2010, p. 95). McKay, 2010, questioned NIMS applicability in the 
context of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and found issues as well.  
The system was now law, as well as a gatekeeper for grant funding. 
Consequently, all disciplines and jurisdictions had to participate, even those which 
questioned the validity of ICS. There was no buy-in effort, nor was there a process, such 
as a comment and review period, or a process for state and local entities to make changes 
before the system became the law of the land (Leifeld, 2007, pp. 106–107 in Jensen, 
2010, p. 95).  
A third issue is the challenge of selective implementation or a pick-and-choose 
mentality used by incident managers. Jensen studied this aspect and found that the 
preponderance of county emergency managers and rural jurisdictions had not 
implemented the system in the way it was intended (2010, p. 69). Rather, they used the 
parts that they saw applicable and disregarded the rest. Their implementation efforts in 
many cases were mainly to be “NIMS compliant,” so that they would be eligible for grant 
funding (Neal & Webb, 2006; Jensen, 2008; Jensen, 2010, pp. 18–19, p.69). This is an 
important question for the research at hand, as this research seeks to identify the issues 
related to management failures. Are individuals subverting the system making it less 
effective through their pick and choose approach, or are there other factors that can be 
identified to improve the system for all involved? 
Cole (2000), however, had a different perspective on research with ICS. He 
ascertained which parts were more important or rated higher than others. This implies 
that agencies were emphasizing or picking the principles that they used most as they used 
ICS. Cole’s research consisted of experienced practitioners from a state. The state was 
California, the birthplace of ICS. These practitioners had operated at countless multi-
agency, multi-jurisdictional incidents. What this research shows is that even though the 
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system may not be used exactly as written, it is still effective. For example, one 
practitioner may rate hierarchy as more important while another may rate terminology 
higher. Maybe this has to do with local conditions, or possibly with local personnel and 
politics. 
Basing their argument on a variety of incidents where management failures 
occurred, there are those who challenge the efficacy of ICS to be the nation’s system 
(Buck, Trainor, & Aquirre, 2006, p. 3; Bellavita, 2010). This author, however, contends 
that the primary cause of these management failures is NIMS and ICS implementation. 
This includes implementation on the grand scale of execution, training, and making the 
system our nation’s system—i.e., as a policy. Further, it includes implementation at 
individual incidents. Cole argues that implementation is a key element when he states that 
“another common criticism of ICS is that there are considerable differences in how the 
system is implemented from one agency to another, and from one region to another 
(2000, p. 212).” Even when jurisdictions adopt and implement NIMS and ICS, there are 
often inconsistencies (Jensen, 2010, pp. 18–19). Implementation can have different 
meanings. In some organizations, ICS implementation simply implies that someone is in 
charge, while in others ICS implementation has been nothing short of “to the letter: 
(Wenger, et al., 1990, p. 9).” Presumably there is everything in between. Organizations 
have a tendency to implement or emphasize what applies to them (Jensen, 2010, pp. 18–
19). Jenson also addresses the topics of implementation, as well as training and practice. 
Her respondents indicate that “the trainings presented a lot of information at one time and 
that there was considerable time between the little training they had. Interviewees stated 
that they did not have enough opportunity to use NIMS before the disaster (Jensen, 2008, 
p. 12).”  Pertinent to this thesis is the concept that multiple authors have discovered that 
entities are using ICS in spirit, even though they are emphasizing different portions—the 
portions that are pertinent to their region. 
As a policy, NIMS implementation was truly ambitions (Jensen 2010, p. 23). 
Untold numbers have been trained to comply with the resultant NIMS mandate that took 
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effect in 200615. Agencies of all types—public health, voluntary organizations active in 
disaster (VOADs), law enforcement, emergency management, EMS, fire, and others were 
now part of the NIMS fold. Courses were structured for and composed of 
interdisciplinary attendees. NIMS was to become part of each organization’s everyday 
organizational operating principle, as well as their default method of operation for multi-
agency and multi-jurisdictional incidents—up to and including incidents, such as those on 
9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. The intent was for local, tribal, state, and federal agencies to 
seamlessly work together, share information, have a common operating picture, and 
maintain situational awareness when disaster strikes. 
Over the next few years, a massive implementation effort ensued. The eventual 
carrot or stick was eligibility for preparedness funding. During what the author will term 
the “compliance years” of 2005 through 2011, the words compliance and all-hazard were 
at the top of every conversation. NIMS would be maintained by the National Integration 
Center (NIC), the “Ongoing Management” arm of NIMS. Individual agencies would keep 
track of their compliance using the National Incident Management System Compliance 
Assistance Support Tool (NIMSCAST). Courses were available through various means 
including classroom-based offerings offered by each state and on-line courses through the 
Emergency Management Institute (EMI). Funding became the driving force. Not only 
funding for grants, but also the possibility for federal reimbursement for major 
incidents—based on using the right forms. Bellavita put it in its simplest form “States and 
local communities are supposed to use NIMS because otherwise they do not get 
homeland security money (2010).” Often this grant money had strings in the form of use 
specifications, such as terrorism. Or, the grant money had pick-up clauses that specified 
an agency must assume the maintenance or payment costs after the third year. It would 
seem that many agencies were applying for grants for things that really were outside of 
what they could do—or as Joseph Pfeifer termed it—their core competencies (Pfeifer 
2005, p. 8). The corresponding term in practitioner circles was “grant crack.” 
                                                 
15 The author’s research yielded that FEMA was not required to report these numbers. 
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Arguably, the resultant effect was that NIMS implementation missed the mark 
(Jensen, 2010, p. 114; Decker, 2011, p. 229). Just as many agencies were going through 
the motions, checking the boxes, so too was the NIMS Implementation effort. On the 
other side of implementation, five or six years later, NIMS in 2011 is still not the way of 
life that it was intended (Jensen, Decker, 2011, p. 229). There has been significant push-
back. Practitioners, administrators, and academics alike are lined up on both sides of the 
“does it or does it not (work)” question. Further, what ICS and NIMS mean to one person 
can be significantly different from what it means to another (Jensen, 2010, pp. 18–19). 
Potentially, there is far less understanding now than when we started. It is evident that 
ICS has suffered the “emergent features problem” identified by Bardach (2009, Kindle p. 
680). Bardach noted that during implementation a policy must be “robust” enough for the 
intent to withstand the emergent features that will develop as the policy takes on its new 
life (Bardach, 2009, pp. 539–540). Pertinent to this thesis is the idea that the original 
intent of ICS may have been different than how is portrayed in the context of NIMS. 
1. Is NIMS the Right System? 
Many emergency management, fire and other public safety professionals 
believe NIMS should be used because their experience says it works, and 
there just aren’t any better alternatives. –Chris Bellavita, 2010 
In September 2005, CNN showed a compelling video of the New Orleans Mayor 
begging for help, not NIMS, from the federal government. The federal government’s own 
NIMS custodian, Michael Brown, did not take advantage of the frameworks available in 
FEMA’s response to New Orleans. More than one author has noted that ICS would not 
have handled the response needed in the initial stages of Hurricane Katrina in New 
Orleans (Buck, et al., 2006, p. 21). California, the birthplace of ICS, operated for nearly 
thirty years in the midst of numerous earthquakes, wildland fires, riots, and other 
significant incidents—without NIMS. Now, they are obligated to use a federally imposed 
system, which is based on the system they created. Academics and practitioners alike are 
asking if NIMS was the solution to the problem we did not have (Jensen, 2010, p. 26). 
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There is concern over the lack of research that proves NIMS is effective in a 
large-scale disaster or catastrophic incident, such as the World Trade Centers and 
Hurricane Katrina. One common criticism, or at least a point that many bring up, is that 
there was no true validation process that proved that ICS was the ideal system for a 
national system (Jensen, 2010, p. 95); Cole, 2000, p. 208; Moynihan, 2007, p. 10). There 
are limited empirical studies (Moynihan, 2007, p. 10). Critics, such as Buck Trainor and 
Aguirre, argue that ICS is an incomplete and emerging system and using “ICS as a 
comprehensive principle of disaster management probably will not succeed as intended 
(Buck et al., 2006, p. i, 3).” Moynihan notes that ICS “arose from craft-based practitioner 
knowledge,” and it has become part of a policy that presents it as “a proven, 
noncontroversial, and common-sense best practice (2008, p. 08).” Comfort, 2007, 
indicates that NIMS “largely ignored the complexity and uncertainty inherent in actual 
disaster environments (p. 190).” 
There seem to be as many proponents as there are opponents of ICS. Cole, 2000, 
states: 
Within CDF there is no longer any doubt about the adaptability and 
effectiveness of ICS for managing emergencies. The majority of CDF's 
employees have never known another system for managing emergencies, 
and although ICS was originally developed for use on major emergency 
incidents, the system has proven so adaptable that its principles have 
become integrated into most facets of CDF's day-to-day emergency 
management activities. ICS is also being used increasingly as a 
management system for planned non-emergency events, such as major 
conferences and training exercises, and for coordinating long-term capital 
improvement projects. (Cole, 2000, p. 207) 
An Ohio survey by Comfort indicated: 
95 per cent of all respondents indicated the principles as applicable in their 
discipline. The fire service and public health disciplines were strongest in 
their views that ICS was applicable in their fields and that the training 
offered was generally beneficial. Law enforcement seemed divided in their 
view of ICS. Police agencies responding to the survey stated that a large 
majority, 88.8 percent, saw ICS training as beneficial to all personnel 
within their organization and 98.0 per cent rated as ‘agree’ or ‘strongly 
agree’ to the statement that ‘ICS training is applicable to personnel in our 
professional discipline’. By contrast, 98 per cent said they do not utilize 
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ICS in their day-to-day operations, and only 55.5 per cent report using ICS 
at least “sometimes” during emergency responses. All said they would 
utilize ICS in the event of a disaster or other major event. The discipline of 
public works had the overall lowest ratings of ICS. Sixty-five percent of 
public works respondents said they were either “undecided” or 
“disagreed” about whether or not ICS was beneficial or applicable to their 
discipline. Nearly all of public works survey participants report that they 
seldom or never utilize ICS principles in day-to-day operations. “We have 
not done a very good job of communicating the importance of a uniform 
command system for use in major incidents and disasters.” (Decker, 2011, 
p. 227) 
The author is unable to find a true and unwavering successful implementation of 
NIMS; however, many ICS successes have been documented. Despite a lack of empirical 
evidence validating the system, some such as Cole, Moynihan, and Long argue there is 
not a better system which can fit with the current context of the United States’ homeland 
security enterprise (Cole, 2000, p. 208; Moynihan, 2007, p. 10; Long, 1990, p. 9). When 
it comes to answering the question of is it or is it not (the right system), at least in 
academic literature, Moynihan may have put it best “It remains an open question whether 
the ICS should be pursued in such settings. To answer this question requires a 
comparison with a viable alternate model of crisis response, and the mandated status of 
the ICS largely precludes such a comparison (Moynihan, 2008, pp. 224–225).” 
Bardach defines a smart or best practice as understanding and making use of what 
looks like good ideas from somewhere else (Bardach, 2009; 1227, 1891). Smart practices 
are not necessarily perfect practices. ICS started as a wildland firefighting system. It was 
adapted for other firefighting incidents, as well as disaster management. Then, it was 
mandated as a national system. ICS transferred from a peer driven system to a nationally 
mandated system. With this transfer, much of the richness of the system has been lost in 
mass implementation and perceptions. Further, the system has taken on a procedural or 
“have-to” mentality versus a flexible or “need-to” mentality. Interoperability of people, 
organizations, and systems has continued to be an issue. This thesis contends that ICS is a 
“smart practice,” which can be improved through the recommendations contained herein. 
What is important to emphasize here is that these are overarching frameworks and 
not the strategies and tactics. In other words, ICS does not tell a local jurisdiction what 
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they must do to resolve the situation. ICS does not replace specific local and regional 
response and disaster planning (ICMA, 2008, p. 40).  
2. NIMS and Complexity—“What Can We Do to Prevent This in the 
Future?” 
Policy often intervenes in systems of some complexity, systems populated 
by actors who adapt to your interventions in surprising ways and whose 
adaptations lead other actors to create still further adaptations. (Bardach, 
2009, Kindle pp. 680–681)  
In summary, intergovernmental crisis management can be reframed as a 
complex, adaptive system that adjusts and adapts its performance to best 
fit the demands of an ever-changing physical, engineered, and social 
environment. (Comfort, 2007, p. 195) 
In recent history, the United States has experienced a number of disasters and 
catastrophic incidents. In the wake of each of these events, government officials and 
citizens examine the response in an effort to determine “What can be done better next 
time?” and “How do we prevent this from happening again?” In the quest for the answer 
to these questions, both elected officials and bureaucrats seek various policies. A recent 
example of this is the National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS is a fusion 
of the ICS and broad governmental policy aimed at providing a systematic response to 
incidents. NIMS is an integral part of the National Response Framework (NRF), which 
specifies federal, state, local, and tribal responsibilities for all aspects of catastrophic 
incidents. NIMS and the NRF are the United State’s policy answers to the question of 
“What can be done better next time?” and “How do we prevent this from happening 
again?” 
As falling grains of sand form a pile, the pile will eventually reach a critical state 
where it cannot support its own weight. Then, it will collapse. This is the analogy used by 
Bak, Tang, and Wiesenfeld (BTW) (1987) to describe a concept called Self-Organized 
Criticality (SOC). Lewis, 2011, describes the concept of SOC as follows: “Systems 
exhibiting SOC tend to self-organize into a critical state, and once in this state, any 
change to the system results in chain reactions that may impact a widespread number of 
elements in the system.” If the process of forming a sand pile was repeated over and over, 
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hundreds then thousands of times, the pile will collapse every time. There will be no 
predictable pattern as to when the pile would collapse, but eventually, if one keeps adding 
sand, every pile will collapse. This applies equally to sand piles as it does to fires, natural 
disasters, mechanical and technological systems, and social and political systems—such 
as NIMS. SOC shows how systems can be simple, but at the same time complex. A small 
adjustment to one part of the system can cause unpredictable and substantial effects to the 
entire system (Lewis, 2011, Kindle pp. 84–91, 100–107). 
The fact that NIMS became policy was quite possibly a predictable event in an 
incremental series of events that began in the early 1970s with the development of ICS. 
The answer to why this occurred may lie in complexity theory. As incremental 
improvements are made to the organization of incident management, it becomes 
increasingly complex. As the complexity increases, systems can approach a point where 
they become so efficient, and their components become so inter-related, that a small 
failure in one part of the system can result in a cascading failure through all of the 
components. The result could be a catastrophic failure of the system. One of the keys 
here, according to BTW and Lewis, is incremental change or adjustment. Lewis, 2011, 
describes the process in the context of various systems. Adjustments are made for 
efficiency, or to allow systems to run at peak capacity. Redundancy and reserve capacity 
is engineered out of the system and the system becomes increasingly interdependent. 
According to Charles Perrow, substantial, but not catastrophic events along the way are 
called “normal accidents.” According to Lewis, 
Society responds to Perrow’s normal accidents by making small 
adaptations, typically to optimize or remedy their perceived cause or 
causes. These adaptations are fed back into the system in order to improve 
it. Self-organization can take many forms (which I will discuss later) but 
in many cases so-called improvements actually drive the system closer to 
its critical point. (2001, pp. 366–369) 
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In the history of the ICS, it is the author’s contention that the fact that NIMS/All-
Hazard ICS16 became a national policy was a normal accident—a hiccup in the history in 
an otherwise useful and smart system. The resultant policy has unknown effects on the 
effectiveness of system. In the context of disaster management, incidents, such as the 
Oklahoma City bombing, the 9/11 attacks, and Hurricane Katrina are presented here as 
the grains of sand. As grains of sand or incidents continue to occur, and add to the virtual 
sand pile of disaster management, policy makers seek to make incident management 
more efficient. By taking ICS, an arguably smart practice, and spreading it across the 
enterprise of homeland security, incident management presumably became more 
efficient. The result was a seemingly simple system with tremendous underlying 
complexities. Bellavita relates to this complexity in the realm of homeland security, and 
in reference to shaping patterns of homeland security, Bellavita, 2006, relates  
The other side of the homeland security strategic jungle – the side 
composed of complex social systems – is characterized by an 
ontological17 state of unorder. Cause and effect are known only after the 
fact, and through consensus. Replicability is illusory at any but the most 
global level of generalization. Best practice is replaced by smart practice, 
emergent practice, or novel practice. (Bellavita, 2006, p. 15)  
Bellavita further states: 
A central justification for speculating about homeland security futures is to 
make strategic decisions [today] that will be sound for all plausible 
futures. Based on the nation’s experiences over the past five years, it 
appears the rapidly formed homeland security community remains too 
disordered to make coherent strategic decisions that have much intentional 
impact on even the short-term future. Instead, we have lots of people and 
organizations making and reacting to multiple homeland security 
decisions, generating a bubbling swamp of intended and unintended 
consequences. (Bellavita, 2006, p. 4) 
 
                                                 
16 The result of HSPD-5 and HSPD-8, which called for a national incident management system and an 
all-hazard national preparedness goal, respectively. 
17 According to Merriam-Webster: Ontological – 1) of or relating to ontology; 2) relating to or based 
upon being or existence. 
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In the context of this discussion, NIMS is an outcropping of a series of events that 
define a pattern in the realm of homeland security. One could view this as a normal 
accident, or a predictable and significant occurrence, in the life of ICS. With or without 
the policy of NIMS, the smart practice of ICS can stand on its own merits. The concepts 
within ICS are simplistic, but when they become part of the NIMS generalization, they 
become a precursor to unorder. 
3. Who Is in Charge? There Can Be More Than One IC or Unified 
Command 
Fundamentally, ICS revolves around a person known as the IC. The system is said 
to be a top-down system that develops around this person based on the management 
needs of the incident (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008, p. 47). Incidents 
that involve only a single agency and a single jurisdiction are called single command 
incidents. In these incidents, Command is graphically represented as a square box with 
the IC’s name inside (See Figure 1) (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008, p. 
49). This box is at the top of an organizational chart that looks graphically similar to a 
traditional business organizational chart (NRT, pp. 9–10). Determination of who will be 
the IC on single command incidents is usually quite simple. Most organizations specify 
this in some form of written procedure. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Single Command (From NRT (p. 9) 
 
 29 
When incidents involve more than one agency or extend beyond one jurisdiction, 
responders use a UC. UC is graphically represented as a triangle at the top of the 
organizational chart (See Figure 2). Instead of there being a person in charge of the 
incident, there is a small group of people who are decision-making representatives for 
each agency and jurisdiction involved in the incident (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2008, pp. 3–13). The group appoints a spokesperson, usually the representative 
from the agency with the greatest operational stake at that phase of the incident, to carry 
forward the orders and decisions of the UC (NRT, pp. 13–14). The name of the 
organization with the greatest operational stake is at the top of the triangle (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2008, pp. 3–15, 3–32). As the objective of the 
operation changes throughout the incident, the organization with the greatest operational 
stake changes also. For example, when immediate life-saving measures are complete and 
the incident becomes primarily a crime scene. When this occurs, the triangle 
(figuratively) rotates, and there is a new organization at the top. Note that the 




Figure 2.   Unified Command (From NRT (p. 15) 
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ICS is a top-down system that uses a scalar network model (NFA, 1988, p. SM 1-
4; NIMS, 2008, p. 47). The literature leads many to believe that there is one “command” 
for a catastrophic incident. In reality, there are several command options for any 
catastrophic incident, and it is possible to have more than one command for a given 
incident. Catastrophic events can begin as a series of calls for distress, or a series of 
occurrences discovered by field operating units. A central dispatcher dispatches the units, 
or units stop and self-assign to incidents that they find. What ensues is a mass effort that 
consists of tens if not hundreds of individual commands18. Therefore, it is incumbent 
upon overhead personnel,19 such as agency administrators, politicians, and emergency 
operations center personnel to implement the appropriate coordination entities or 
command options to support the individual commands that will emerge. This will reduce 
the number of individual commands and autonomous resources, but it takes time to 
accomplish. The important concept to note is coordinating these commands (Jensen, 
2008, pp. 8–9).  
Incidents, such as the Oklahoma City bombing, the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon 
and the Atlanta Olympics bombing, occurred in well-defined areas and were appropriate 
for one UC (Moynihan, 2007, p. 16). These incidents were handled with more of a 
textbook version of the ICS chart. An IC can handle these incidents in a different manner 
than a natural disaster, which occurs over a large area. In such cases, the UC can consider 
options, such as an Area Command20, an Incident Complex21, multiple operations or 
                                                 
18 In many jurisdictions, for example, each car accident, medical call, building fire, etc. is an 
individual command. 
19 In ICS terminology, “overhead” personnel are “Personnel who are assigned to supervisory positions 
which include IC, Command Staff, General Staff, Directors, Supervisors, and Unit Leaders (ICS Term 
Glossary, 1994).” 
20 Area Command:  An organization established to oversee the management of multiple incidents that 
are each being handled by a separate ICS organization or to oversee the management of a very large or 
evolving incident that has multiple Incident Management Teams engaged. An Agency 
Administrator/Executive or other public official with jurisdictional responsibility for the incident usually 
makes the decision to establish an Area Command. An Area Command is activated only if necessary, 
depending on the complexity of the incident and incident management span-of-control considerations. 
(NIMS, 2008, p. 135). 
21 An Incident Complex is two or more individual incidents located in the same general proximity that 
are assigned to a single IC or Unified Command to facilitate management. (ICS 400 SM, p. 3–18). 
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logistics sections, or Branch Tactical Planning22 (ICS 400, 2008; Moynihan, 2007, p. 
207). Much of the literature fails to discuss these or other options. The ICS that is 
portrayed to the masses does not embrace these concepts. The 2011 version of the NIMS 
Training Program specifies “Everyone involved in emergency management (to include 
emergency operation center personnel in support of the field), regardless of discipline or 
level of government, should take the NIMS baseline curriculum courses (Independent 
Study-700 and ICS-100).” ICS 100 does not cover any of these concepts. IS-700 
addresses Area Command on two slides and MACS on three slides. The content is 
superficial. Hence, the preponderance of responders may have a different understanding 
of ICS than the overhead personnel. 
ICS-400: Advanced ICS, (2008) outlines that multiple commands and area 
commands are coordinated through MACS. An EOC is a MACC, and it is possible for an 
incident to have multiple MACCs or EOCs, if it is of a large enough magnitude. MACS 
coordinate through a state official and the Federal Coordinating Officer (NRF, 2008, p. 
67). A common misconception is that the Federal Coordinating Officer, who is the 
federal government’s representative on disasters and catastrophic incidents, works with 
the IC or UC. While this can occur, it is more appropriate that the Federal Coordinating 
Officer interfaces with the MACC to provide assistance, coordination, and resources 
(NRF, 2008, p. 67).  
Both NIMS and ICS make it clear who is in charge at a given situation (NIMS 
2008, pp. 48–51). Proponents of the system say that this is clearly delineated within the 
framework and should not be an issue. In reality, this is often a contentious question 
(Carwile, 2006, p. 1–2). ICS rests on a delegation of authority by the top elected or 
appointed official for the jurisdiction (NIMS 2008, pp. 48–51). For example, in a city 
with a strong mayor form of government, the Mayor would appoint the IC or the 
members of the UC. There are many types of jurisdictions, however. For example, an 
                                                 
22 Branch Tactical Planning means that the detailed action plans are developed within the Operations 
Section at the Branch level with the Planning Section providing support and coordination. It is used when: 
1) The incident becomes so large that there is no single set of objectives that would logically pertain to the 
entire incident. 2) Special technical expertise is needed for planning. 3) It is not otherwise feasible to 
prepare and distribute the IAP within the required timeframe. (ICS 400 SM, p. 3–29). 
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incident that occurs on an interstate highway going through the middle of a city may fall 
under the command of the state police or highway patrol by state statute. With very few 
exceptions, each incident occurs where some governmental agency has jurisdiction. 
When an incident occurs in an area that spans multiple jurisdictions, such as two 
neighboring cities, members from each jurisdiction compose the UC (Carwile, 2006, p. 
2). 
The question of “who is in charge?” is directly relevant to the primary research 
question because it addresses the issue of a misunderstanding by many. This ties to ICS 
implementation and failed implementation. Having to focus on who is in charge when the 
most dynamic part of the incident response is happening is akin to a football team 
arguing who is going to make a tackle. Deeper than this is the issue of the flexibility and 
scalability of ICS, its ability to accommodate a range of incidents. Those who would 
question its ability may not be considering the entire system. The answers to the question 
of “who is in charge?” are “it depends” and “of what.” There is no simple answer. 
C. SCALABILITY 
One of the key aspects with the applicability of ICS as a national system is 
scalability, or the ability to accommodate a variety of incidents (Christen et al., 2001, p. 
1). NIMS is considered to be, 
A comprehensive national approach, applicable at all jurisdictional levels 
and across functional disciplines, improves the effectiveness of emergency 
management/response personnel across the full spectrum of potential 
incidents and hazard scenarios (including but not limited to natural 
hazards, terrorist activities, and other manmade disasters). (NIMS, 2008, 
p. 5)   
There are few authors who would disagree with the concept that NIMS has 
properties that make it scalable, but not all agree that it is infinitely so. Moynihan and 
Quarantelli indicate that as the size of the organization grows, there becomes a certain 
point in which it becomes less effective due to the difficulty in coordination (2009, p. 3; 
1998, p. 383). One has to question if this growth issue relates to management failures 
more broadly? Although ICS is generally presented and intended to serve as a system that 
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can adapt to different sized departments and incidents, the ICS framework’s ability is 
questioned by these authors with regard to this important issue of growth. 
Pertaining to the issue of growth, a common theme among the available literature 
is that it looks at a microcosm of ICS. This microcosm is the traditional ICS chart (See 
Appendix B), where the IC or UC is “in-charge.” Much of the research fails to consider 
the concepts taught in ICS-400: Advanced ICS.23 This is significant because it has the 
effect of distorting the way many people see ICS. To this author, this is the crux of many 
ICS issues, perceptions and misconceptions. The idea that there can only be one 
“command,” and that everything else works through that command, is only one small 
example of how ICS works. Tying this to Moynihan, while it is evident that as the size of 
the organization grows, coordination becomes difficult; one must consider that there are 
other options, such as the concepts mentioned above to address this issue. 
Catastrophic incidents and disasters have many variables, and management 
success or failure goes well beyond just implementing a given management system. This 
is a core consideration in this research. ICS and NIMS are not strategies and tactics for 
disaster management. They are frameworks for managing the response. Strategies and 
tactics for a given incident or disaster must come from skilled practitioners and 
preparedness—there is no simple checklist to follow (Harrald, 2006, p. 264). A report by 
the Government Accountability Office supports this concept by noting “We also 
identified the need for validated operational planning in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina, noting that to be effective, national response policies must be supported by 
robust operational plans. (GAO, 2010, p. 4)” 
D. FLEXIBILITY 
Effective responses depend on the ability of organizations to 
simultaneously sustain structure and allow for flexibility in the face of 
rapidly changing disaster conditions and unexpected demands. (The 
National Research Council, 2006, p. 143 in Jensen, 2008, p. 2) 
 
                                                 
23 These concepts include incident complexes, dividing an incident into two or more commands, 
branch tactical planning, area commands, and multi-agency coordination systems (MACS). 
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Traditional science and certainty will not lead us to a homeland security 
future worth creating. Adaptability may. Chris Bellavita (2006, pp. 11–12)  
In the context of ICS implementation, both as a policy and as an on-scene 
management system, flexibility is a key issue. Authors support both sides of the issues of 
flexibility, adaptability, and improvisation. Some argue for a closed, or command and 
control type of system. Others argue in favor of an open, adaptable system. Some propose 
that the two types exist in harmony and do not negate each other. For example, Harrald 
suggests, 
The discipline provided by the ICS and the improvisation required by a 
problem-solving, open-system response are often assumed to be opposite 
ends of a linear scale. Recent experience prior to Hurricane Katrina, 
however, suggests that these are not opposites, that agility and discipline 
can both be achieved. Successful improvisation and creativity during the 
response to the attacks on the World Trade Center are discussed by 
Kendra and Wachtendorf (2002), Mendonça (2005), and Mendonça and 
Wallace (2004). Improvisation in the context of a successful 
implementation of an ICS structure during the response to the Pentagon is 
described in Harrald, Renda-Tanali, & Coppola (2002, 2006, p. 268) 
The NRF and NIMS both propose their flexibility. For example, the NRF (2008) 
states, 
It can be partially or fully implemented in the context of a threat, in 
anticipation of a significant event, or in response to an incident. Selective 
implementation allows for a scaled response, delivery of the exact 
resources needed, and a level of coordination appropriate to each event. 
…Response must be quickly scalable, flexible, and adaptable. (p. 47)  
Other authors concur,  
The adaptability of ICS means that the system can accommodate not only 
a variety of incident types, but also a variety of incident sizes and 
operational environments. Since specific functions and organizational 
elements are activated only at the time and to the extent dictated by the 
operational requirements of a particular incident, the system can be 
custom-scaled to the needs at hand. (Chase, 1980; Goldfarb 1997; in Cole, 
2000, p. 212) 
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Yet, others challenge this claim. Walker et al. (1994, p. 42) stated that “the 
traditional NIIMS was designed as a closed, command and control system” and that it 
historically operated effectively in emergency situations where like organizations (e.g., 
firefighters) with uniform goals and relatively homogeneous organizational cultures were 
integrated into a single organization (Harrald, 2006, p. 263). Harrald further states that “It 
is doubtful that the extensive and expensive changes to the National Response System 
preserved the agility, flexibility, and creativity that have been essential in past response 
operations (2006, p. 269). 
Harrald proposes an “Organizational Typology of Response Organizations” based 
on a matrix using agility and discipline. Agility refers to the culture of an organization in 
terms of rigidity or creativeness. Discipline refers to the structure of the organization, 




Figure 3.   An Organizational Typology of Response Organizations (From Harrald, 2006, 
p. 268 
According to Harrald, the United States’ system (NIMS) is a 
“Bureaucratic/Procedural” system characterized by defined structure and well-defined 
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processes and procedures. This type of system is relatively rigid and unable to change. 
“Bureaucratic/Procedural” systems have the weakness of not being to recognize and 
adapt to unexpected events, and they are in danger of becoming bound by procedure. 
They do exhibit the ability to mobilize and coordinate mass resources and can produce 
consistent training. (Harrald, 2006, p. 268) 
In Harrald’s Organizational Typology, the ideal system is a “Balanced/Adaptive” 
system. He gives the example of the performance of the United States Coast Guard’s 
performance during Hurricane Katrina. The Coast Guard was able to adapt to the 
multitude of circumstances and affect the rescue and evacuation of multitudes of trapped 
victims. “Balanced/Adaptive” systems are characterized by a defined structure with well-
defined processes and procedures, but they are also able to be creative and improvise. 
Their weakness is that leaders “must be innovative as well as technically competent” and 
the selection and training of leaders is difficult. “Balanced/Adaptive” systems have the 
strengths of a “Bureaucratic/Procedural” organization, but they differ in that they have 
the ability to rapidly adjust to circumstances and other coordinating organizations. The 
goal, according to Harrald, would be for NIMS and ICS to resemble a 
“Balanced/Adaptive” system. 
Other authors concur with the spirit of Harrald’s work. Mendonca, 2001, suggests 
that “organizations need to maintain flexibility in order to respond to unanticipated 
contingencies (p. 38).” Koehler, Kress and Miller stated: “due to some or all of these 
factors, the planned emergency response system will probably not be the one that 
emerges. The one that does emerge, most likely, will have a tendency to be locally self-
organizing, somewhat unpredictable in its interorganizational linkages, and likely to 
succeed or fail in unpredictable ways (2001, p. 295; Jensen, 2008, p. 3).” Further, 
Comfort concludes “The conceptual framework for an emergency management system 
must necessarily accommodate change and uncertainty (2007, p. 193)” 
Policy Option B discusses the need for flexibility in incident management. Its 
focus is on adaptability as opposed to scalability. Flexibility in this sense will be coupled 
with the concepts of considering the individuality and locality of each incident and 
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region. Individuality and locality are properties of self-organizing systems24. It is the goal 
of this thesis to show that flexibility will reduce complexity in NIMS and ICS. 
E. THE “ALL HAZARD” MEDIOCRE GENERALISTS 
In recent times, there has been an increased emphasis on All-Hazard and All 
Hazard IMTs. This is a result of HSPD-8, which required an all-hazard preparedness 
goal. ICS has been part of “a long term, all-hazard concept” since the 1980s or earlier 
(NFA, 1988, p. xi). During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the ICS text indicated that it 
was an all-hazard system (ICS, 1988, p. xi). Further, other documents have been part of 
the all-hazard concept for years. One example was the 1996 publication of the FEMA 
Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning. The “All-hazard” concept is not 
new; however, it is new to many with the implementation of NIMS. 
“All-hazard” has several implications for the conversation at hand. Since 2003, 
when President George W. Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive-525 
and Homeland Security Presidential Directive-826, the term “all-hazard” has taken on 
various meanings (Bellavita, 2008, p. 4). To some, such as in the 2007 National Strategy 
for Homeland Security, it is interpreted as every possible hazard (HSC, 2007). While to 
others, it means the most probable hazards (Waugh in Bellavita, 2008, p. 4). According to 
Donahue et al., “The all hazards approach attempts to “optimize” (in a loose sense) 
institutional plans and actions across disaster scenarios by trading off specificity for a 
general reduction in hazard or risk (Donahue et al., 2012, p. 1).” Some of this debate 
stems from, and adds to, the lack of a single definition of “homeland security” (Bellavita, 
2008, pp. 1–2).  
Part of the current “all-hazard” has been fiscally focused. The other part has been 
in an effort to develop an air of inclusiveness (FEMA, 2010, p. 1–2). One example 
occurred after 9/11 when there was additional funding available for terrorism response 
                                                 
24 Self-organizing systems are elaborated in Chapter III, Policy Option A. 
25 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) established a national incident management 
system. 
26 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8) established a national preparedness goal. 
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and preparedness (GAO, 2012, p. 1). Some of the stipulations on the equipment were 
interpreted as so stringent, that agencies were not able to use equipment bought with 
“terrorism money” for incidents such as natural disasters (GAO, 2012, p. 16). In 2010, 
the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report came out with a modified definition 
of homeland security that included natural disasters: “Homeland security is a concerted 
national effort to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism 
and other hazards where American interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive (DHS, 
2010, p. 11).” This lifted the perceived restrictions and made terrorism money and 
disaster money interchangeable. 
Moynihan concluded, “Even with command and control systems, ICSs depend on 
network values, such as trust and norms of reciprocity to succeed (2007, p. 7).” This 
considers the soft or people part of disaster and catastrophic incident management. It ties 
directly to an air of inclusiveness that has come with the implementation of NIMS and 
also ties to the term “all-hazard.” Simply, we need each other and turf wars have no place 
in a command post or emergency operations center. It is the author’s opinion, that with 
the new “all-hazard” focus, the pendulum has swung far to the side of inclusiveness. This 
concept is discussed further in Chapter V, Policy Option C. 
The recent “all-hazard” emphasis has caused a generalization in the response 
community. According to Donahue, the 1996 publication of the FEMA Guide for All-
Hazard Emergency Operations Planning marked the shift from specific scenario planning 
to focus on a general approach that addressed commonalities between hazards (Donahue 
et al., 2012, p. 1). Arguably, this was a key moment in the shift to what the author terms 
“mediocre generalists,” or incident managers who believe they can manage incidents 
based on the checklists and guidance given by NIMS. It has given many the idea that they 
are prepared for anything because of their ICS training. If anything, this is a false sense of 
security. ICS is not a strategy for an incident. It is the management of the management of 
the incident. Setting up an efficient office and running an efficient planning cycle does 
not solve real problems caused by a disaster or catastrophic incident. Real people who are 
experts in their discipline will always be needed to develop the strategies and carry out 
the tactics (Ennis, 2008, p. 58). 
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F. LITERATURE REVIEW ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS: 
A critical review of the literature shows that ICS is a top-down system that 
employs a hierarchical organizational structure, much like the organizational chart for a 
business (NFA, 1988, p. SM 1-4; NIMS, 2008, p. 47). When a disaster or catastrophic 
event occurs, there is no instant command post set up, or even an indication of what scale 
of command system is needed—incidents do not wear signs with instructions. But as 
argued above, incident scope and complexity determine the command structure (NIMS, 
2008, p. 47). The initial stages of a catastrophic incident are marked by random 
emergency calls and random acts of heroism on the part of responders and citizens. From 
the initial responses to these calls emerges a solution to the problem (NRF, 2008, p. 8; 
Comfort, 2007, p. 189). First responders are the eyes and ears of the later arriving UC 
personnel. They pass information and support needs up to a dispatcher or a higher-
ranking officer who then overlays an appropriate, scalable and flexible organization to fit 
the dynamic situation found at the scene. From this base of response, responders must 
build a command structure or structures appropriate for the disaster throughout the “life” 
of the event. The contention in this thesis is that, during the initial stages of a response, 
ICS is not a top-down management system. Rather, it is more like a bottom-up, or self 
organizing system that adheres to general goals due to the well-known common purposes 
of the responders. This thesis will show that incident success is more likely when 
command personnel acknowledge the “bottom-up,” or self-organizing system that 
naturally occurs during the initial stages. Once commanders acknowledge this portion of 
the response, they can take it into account as part of their planning for the sustained 
response. It is the IC/UCs job to support these efforts while developing an action plan for 
a sustained response. Further, the thesis will show how this bottom up response is the 
natural state for first responders, and that it fits current ICS conventions.  
One of the virtues of ICS has been that it could be used at any type or complexity 
of incident (NFA, 1988, p. xi; Christen et al., 2001, p. 1) (OKC, 1995, p. B-176; NIMS, 
2008). In recent years, there has been a shift away from “real world ICS” that the former 
ICS manuals referred to (NFA, 1990; NIMS, 2008). Daily practitioners of ICS know how 
to apply ICS to “normal” incidents, those which occur with some regularity. Most, if not 
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all of these incidents are handled with local or regional resources (ICS-300 SM, 2005, pp. 
2–23). They use an organization that addresses the individuality and locality of the 
incident.  
There is an often misunderstood concept in the ICS; the idea that there is one 
IC/UC for a disaster or catastrophic incident. In reality, there may be a varying number of 
commands at any point in time. These commands are supported by one or more Multi-
Agency Coordination Systems (MACS), such as Emergency Operations Centers (ICS-
400, 2008). The job of MACS is to coordinate with each other as a network of systems 
(ICS-400, 2008).  
When one considers that a network of responders has the ability to self-organize 
into an effective initial effort, one must also consider that their effort considers the 
individuality and locality of the situation. Such a network is adaptable and flexible in a 
way that a “top-down” organization cannot be (Harrald, 2006, p. 270). Earlier ICS 
manuals emphasized the need for flexibility in implementation; however, more recent 
NIMS documents do not share this emphasis (ICS, 1988; NIMS, 2008). The 2008 version 
of the NRF states that “Incidents start local and end local.” Further, the NRF emphasizes 
flexibility in many areas of the text, suggesting more of a framework for incident 
management than a procedure. This thesis suggests that there is a disconnect in the intent 
of incident management as a whole, and the current ethos and teachings surrounding ICS 
and NIMS.  
One of the weaknesses of ICS in years past was that it was construed as a fire 
service system (Cole 2000, pp. 209–210; Hannestad 2005, p. 23). In many cases, it 
became an issue when the main players: Fire, Law Enforcement, and EMS were not 
working together. Pertinent to this thesis is the concept that the pendulum has swung far 
to the side of inclusiveness in UC. After the 9/11 attacks, American policy makers 
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dedicated massive resources to implementing the new NIMS.27 Part of the federal grant 
structure for response agencies changed to include requirements for NIMS compliance. 
Since then, there has been a tremendous surge in the number of personnel from varied 
types of organizations trained in the National Incident Management System. NIMS and 
the NRF provide the framework for coordination and cooperation among various 
governmental, nongovernmental, and private organizations. This is the crux of the reason 
for training so many nontraditional responders, such as nongovernmental and private 
organizations. Familiarizing these parties with NIMS and the NRF will facilitate 
implementation. Important in this thesis is the concept that the pendulum has swung far 
to the side of inclusiveness in UC. This is significant because it directly affects the 
implementation of a UC or an EOC, and hence, affects the success of ICS.  
There is a correlation between management failures in disasters and unwillingness 
or an inability on the part of managers to take advantage of strategic frameworks for 
success, which are often contained in the ICS. Several factors contribute to this issue. The 
first is a failure on the part of administrators, educators, and responders to recognize the 
differences in the management approach needed in the initial stages of a disaster, as 
opposed to the traditional top-down model of managing the sustained response to long-
term incidents. A second factor is that the adoption of ICS as part of the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) has exacerbated this unwillingness through a real or 
perceived loss of local autonomy and flexibility. Third, in the transition to “All-Hazard” 
ICS, there has developed an atmosphere of over-inclusiveness regarding members of the 
UC.  
                                                 
27 According to the Government Accountability Office, “From fiscal years 2002 through 2011, the 
federal government appropriated over $37 billion to the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 
preparedness grant programs to enhance the capabilities of state and local governments to prevent, protect 
against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks. DHS allocated $20.3 billion of this funding to grant 
recipients through four of the largest preparedness grant programs—the State Homeland Security Program, 
the Urban Areas Security Initiative, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit Security Grant 
Program. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 requires the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) to develop a national preparedness system and assess preparedness 
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III. DISCUSSION OF POLICY OPTION A—ACKNOWLEDGING 
THE BOTTOM-UP RESPONSE WHEN IMPLEMENTING ICS? 
Beware of the individual that says, ‘Don’t do anything until I get there!’  
–Alan V. Brunacini, Fire Command, 1985 
It is not more command and control that we are after. Instead, we seek to 
decrease the amount of command and control that we need. (U.S. Marine 
Corps, 1996, p. 110 in Moody, 2010, p. 17) 
A. RECOMMENDATION 
Acknowledge the bottom-up response that occurs when implementing ICS at 
major incidents: Modify ICS and NIMS training and implementation to change the ethos 
of ICS from a top-down system to a bottom-up system during the initial stages of a major 
incident. Emphasize the importance of the phase of major incidents that begins with its 
occurrence and ends with the beginning of the first operational period.28 
B. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
This option proposes a revision to NIMS and ICS education and training 
representing a paradigm shift from a top-down system to a bottom-up system during the 
initial stages of the response. Currently, the emphasis is on establishing a top-down 
organization that has command and control of the incident. Additionally, a substantial 
focus is on activities performed by an incident management team29 (IMT). This top-down 
approach, when combined with teaching ICS to responders who do not use ICS for daily 
operations, has resulted in a lack of awareness of the nature of the initial response—a 
                                                 
28 NIMS/ICS Operational Period: “The time scheduled for executing a given set of operation actions, 
as specified in the Incident Action Plan. Operational periods can be of various lengths, although usually 
they last 12 to 24 hours.” 
29 IMT* in this sense is referring to full staffing of the ICS overhead organization. Per NIMS, 2008, 
“An IMT is an incident command organization made up of the Command and General Staff members and 
other appropriate personnel in an ICS organization and can be deployed or activated, as needed.”  
The General Staff is: Command, Planning, Operations, Logistics, and Finance. The Command Staff is 
the Safety Officer, Liaison Officer, and Public Information Officer.  
*The above definition is somewhat different than the recent thought of an IMT. They recently become 
known to many as a designated group of specific individuals, a designated “State” IMT, or other variation 
based on those who have been credentialed as such. 
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diminishing of the art of the IC. Daily practitioners, such as police officers and 
firefighters, are keenly aware of this stage because it is their normal operating 
environment. They are “first” or initial responders. This critical period is when most 
victims are saved and most property is protected (O'Leary 2004, pp. 350–351). In law 
enforcement incidents, this is the critical time where fast action saves lives (Moody 2010, 
p. 2). Thus, ICS should be modified to recognize this phase of the incident and spend 
more time preparing all responders to deal with the difficulties encountered in the initial 
stages. The underlying lesson plans and curriculum should be adjusted to recognize and 
address the initial stages and the emerging part of the response to disasters and 
catastrophic incidents. The results will help prevent the consequences seen with 
management failures in the past, as well as provide for a better transition to an IMT at a 
later stage.  
ICS has foundations in both business management and military doctrines. Both 
make use of a traditional scalar, hierarchical organizational chart (See Appendix B) 
(Molino, 2006, p. 2; ICS, 1988, pp. 1–3; Morgan in Buck et al., 2006, p. 1). Among the 
traditional management principles are planning, directing, organizing, coordinating, 
communicating, delegating, and evaluating (ICS, 1988, pp. 1–3). Military doctrine 
contributes the concepts of command, control, coordination, and communications, known 
as “C4” (Molino, 2006, p. 2). Together, these principles emphasize the ethos that the 
IC/UC is the source of all orders that equate to action.  
The concepts mentioned above are popularly accepted and have led to many ICS 
successes. However, when one looks at one of the most difficult and chaotic phases of an 
emergency response, the initial stages, the traditional top-down view of ICS may not fit 
what is actually happening (Drabek & McEntire, pp. 200–203). The initial stage of a 
response is the time from occurrence to the point when an IMT begins managing the 
incident in specified operational periods based on an incident action plan (IAP). Formal 
operational periods mark the beginning of the sustained response. There is no set time to 
the initial stage. It may be minutes or hours, but it can be days in some circumstances. In 
ICS terms and conventions, the initial stage time is the period from occurrence until 
responders form a command organization that moves graphically off of the leg of a model 
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called the “Planning P” and begins operating in a cycle represented by the circular or top 
portion of the “Planning P” (See Figure 4). Once this cycle begins, it repeats continuously 
until the command is terminated. In each cycle, the present command prepares an IAP for 
the on-coming command members. This is the part of ICS to which the position specific 
checklists found throughout the ICS and NIMS literature apply.  
The initial response is critical. If responders cannot adapt and manage during this 
portion, it can delay moving to the sustained response, as well as cost precious time and 
resources. In the initial stages, the emphasis should not be as much on control as it should 
be on coordination and support (Drabek & McEntire, 2002, p. 199, 215; Harrald, 2006, p. 
260). 
  
Figure 4.   The Planning P (From NIMS, 2008, p. 123) 
ICS was developed as a model system. The organizational chart in Figure 4 is a 
graphical representation of the ICS. This is the ICS that most learn. The model does not 
show ICS in action. It does not show the emergent or self-organizing portion of a disaster 
or catastrophic incident. It does not show a UC. It does not show any of the advanced 




The model is a simplified way of expressing the system on paper. If this is the picture of 
ICS known by many, is it possible that the perception of ICS and the actual needs of the 
incident are different?  
This thesis supports the concept that ICS has been oversimplified to the masses 
resulting in a potential for misapplication of ICS concepts. In other words, because the 
initial stages of an incident are not emphasized in the most basic ICS training, responders 
could easily end up trying to apply concepts in the initial stages, which are better suited 
for setting up a sustained command. This is especially true because these concepts are the 
ones emphasized most in the ICS course. Specifically, the concepts to which the author is 
referring are those; such as the use of IMTs, full command and general staff 
implementation, and an emphasis on the sustained response. An analysis of ICS 200, 
Single Resources and Initial Action Incidents, shows that substantially the same basic 
constructs are taught in this course as are taught throughout other ICS courses30 (ICS 
200, 2005). It is not teaching responders how to operate in the initial stages as the name 
implies. 
Even among practitioners and experts there are misunderstandings about the 
initial stages (Buck et al., 2006, p. 4). This is supported by Buck, Trainor, and Aguirre 
who suggest that applying the ICS model to an event with the magnitude of Hurricane 
Katrina reveals that it does not work well in certain phases of response efforts for events 
that have not been encountered before. They found that: 
Many social demands produced by disasters are too complex and 
unexpected to be handled by ICS. The command and control model does 
not currently, and given the social complexity, likely never will work for 
all phases of disaster operations. The federal government’s hopes to apply 
NIMS to all phases of disaster operation are misguided. (Wenger et al. in 
Buck et al., 2006, p. 21) 
Another author, who has written about the initial stages, describes the 
misapplications that exist: 
                                                 
30 For example, ICS-100: Introduction to the Incident Command, ICS-300: Intermediate ICS, ICS-
400: Advanced ICS, IS-700: National Incident Management System (NIMS), An Introduction. 
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Is event response really as simple as arriving, pulling out the NIMS 
checklists for the various positions and then starting to go down the list of 
“items to do”?  Would that have worked at the Twin Towers on 9/11?  Did 
it work in the nationwide response to Hurricane Katrina? While those 
checklists are invaluable once a situation has moved into the Cynefin 
arena of “complicated,” they are not the proper tool to apply in the initial, 
chaotic phase of event response. (Renaud, 2010, p. 68) 
Renaud is correct. The position specific checklists are not the answer to a 
dynamic and chaotic environment. In the context of the current ICS courses, the 
checklists are not for the initial stages. They are for the IMT. This quote shows, however, 
that there are those who would suggest that the opposite is true. The opposite being that 
there are those who have the understanding that the key to managing any incident is to do 
exactly that—show up and start working on the checklists. The author’s experience has 
shown that there are people teaching this, and students who are being led to believe this. 
Further, an analysis of ICS 20031 and ICS 30032 show that there is definitely not a 
concerted effort to teach responders how to operate in the initial stages or how to actually 
make the transfer to an IMT. Both courses briefly address the initial response and the 
transfer of command to the sustained response, but it is done in the context of using a top-
down organization in the initial stages. The courses do not account for the chaos in the 
initial stages.  
ICS can be used for incidents33 or events34. In the context of this section, the 
author is primarily speaking of incidents. The difference between incidents and events is 
primarily when the response occurs. For example, a training exercise is an event. The 
response and organization occurs after the IC knows about the occurrence. With an 
incident, the IC may know about a looming hurricane, tornado, or flood, but he or she 
                                                 
31 ICS-200, Basic ICS, Single Resources and Initial Actions. 
32 ICS-300, Intermediate ICS. 
33 Incident, An occurrence, natural or manmade, that requires a response to protect life or property. 
Incidents can, for example, include major disasters, emergencies, terrorist attacks, terrorist threats, civil 
unrest, wildland and urban fires, floods, hazardous materials spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, 
earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical storms, tsunamis, war-related disasters, public health and 
medical emergencies, and other occurrences requiring an emergency response. (NIMS, 2008, p. 140). 
34 Event, See Planned Event. Planned Event: A scheduled nonemergency activity (e.g., sporting event, 
concert, parade, etc.). (NIMS, 2008, p. 144). 
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does not know exactly where and when the initial response(s) will occur. It is a difference 
of the speed at which the IC must make decisions and the flow, quality, and amount of 
information the IC will have access to (NIMS, 2008, pp. 139–140). 
A 2010 CHDS thesis by Cynthia Renaud explored the application of a framework, 
called the Cynefin (See Figure 5) framework, to the initial stages of an incident. One of 
the weaknesses of ICS according to Renaud was its inability to address the initial stages 
of an incident (Renaud, 2010, p. xiii). Renaud stated that, “While NIMS and ICS are very 
effective at structuring and organizing multiple response efforts in a stable environment, 
they are not an effective tool first responders can use during the initial phase of chaos 
inherent in every unstable large-scale event (Renaud, 2010, pp. 24–25).” Specifically, she 
explored a concept called the “edge of chaos,” which is the transition from a chaotic 
environment, such as the initial stages of a massive incident to an environment where the 
IC or UC would feel that they have the incident under some sort of control. Her thesis 
suggested that there were certain individuals who were more capable than others to do 
this. She suggested that these individuals should be discovered and trained for this task 
(Renaud, 2010, p. 45). Renaud envisioned the framework as a way to discern certain 
leaders and further their training.  
 
 
Figure 5.   The Cynefin Framework (From Wikipedia at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cynefin) 
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While not quite the same as the thesis here, much of the basis is the same. The 
author believes it important to first acknowledge the work done by Renaud. The author 
agrees with Renaud’s work in many areas. Further, the author finds it important to 
differentiate what is being said here from that of Renaud. Renaud’s work focused on a 
framework that could be used by a person. Further, her work indicated training people 
who were found to be the type of person that could step up and be the leader in these 
extreme circumstances. This thesis focuses on a change in the ethos across all responders. 
It would have all responders trained to expect what happens early in disasters and 
catastrophic incidents and give them certain guidelines to follow that would assist the 
IC/UC in coordinating the initial response and transitioning to an IMT. Further, this 
thesis discusses the specific ways that ICs/UCs might go about transitioning from the 
initial stages to an IMT. Once responders, administrators, and politicians recognize the 
initial chaos as a normal or a natural part of an incident, they can move past the fact that 
it is chaotic and begin to fix it when the time is appropriate. Responders, administrators, 
and politicians alike must remember - that mess is saving people’s lives and property.  
Renaud’s application of the Cynefin Framework to ICS and emergency response 
can yield a basis for recommendations here, as well as an understanding of how humans 
act when faced with certain situations. When faced with a chaotic environment, such as 
the events of 9/11 or another catastrophic incident, the Cynefin framework tells us: 
This is the realm of unknowables. In the chaotic domain, a leader’s 
immediate job is not to discover patterns but to stanch the bleeding. A 
leader must first act to establish order, then sense where stability is present 
and from where it is absent, and then respond by working to transform the 
situation from chaos to complexity. (Snowden & Boone, 2007, pp. 5–6) 
The chaotic realm speaks to the emergence of the response, or the bottom-up 
organization that occurs in a disaster. This is the natural state, for responders (Moody, 
2010, p. 50). When faced with chaos, they act on understanding of general goals or 
priorities. This is consistent with the ICS priorities: 1) Life safety, 2) Incident 






goal is to merge the initial actions of first responders together with an accurate damage 
assessment. Then, the UC can begin to layer in an organization that will form the basis of 
the sustained response.  
There is a push-pull relationship however. The current ICS paradigm is in conflict 
with the actions that responders know that they need to do in the initial stages. In a true 
top-down system, responders are not supposed to act until assigned a task by the IC. This 
creates a push-pull in the minds of many responders. They see what needs done. They 
know how to take care of it. They know they need to act fast, but they are not supposed 
to. Further, this conflict can give members of the incident command or UC the wrong 
impression. They are expecting to step in and command a response as opposed to 
coordinate an emergent response.  
What is actually an emergent organization is often seen as disorganization or 
unorder. Responders, such as police officers and firefighters, are trained to operate 
without the need for intense supervision (Moody 2010, p. 53). According to Krulak (in 
Moody), they are trained to operate “far from the flagpole (1999, p. 16; 2010, p. 53). In 
the words of the United States Marine Corp manual, Command and Control, “it is not 
more command and control that we are after. Instead, we seek to decrease the amount of 
command and control that we need (1996, p. 110 in Moody, 2010, p. 53).”  Responders 
know what to do. Command must support their efforts to perform in the initial stages and 
“loosely influence field resources in a fashion that is ‘more akin to the willing 
cooperation of a basketball team’ than to the “omnipotent direction of the chess player” 
(USMC 1996, p. 42 in Moody, 2010, p. 17). 
Decker concurs with one of the author’s main tenants, the need for self-
organization and emergence in the initial stages of a catastrophic event. His work lends 
credence to the weakness of the top-down approach that most practitioners use when 
implementing ICS: 
The problem with this top-down approach is that it violates two basic 
features of biological (and many physiochemical) phenomena: 
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individuality and locality. ….The tenet of locality means that every event 
or interaction has some location and some range of effect [Kawata & 
Toquenaga, 1994]…To say that a system is self-organized is to say it is 
not entirely directed by top-down rules, although there might be global 
constraints on the system. Instead, the local actions and interactions of 
individuals generate ordered structures at higher levels with recognizable 
dynamics. Since the origins of order in SOS are the subtle differences 
among components and the interactions among them, system dynamics 
cannot usually be understood by decomposing the system into its 
constituent parts. (Decker, 2001, p. 3)  
The missing component and challenge for would-be ICs who are moving to 
establish an overall organization for a catastrophic incident is to support the emergence 
and improvisation of responders during the initial stages while at the same time layering 
in an organization that provides a support structure and gives objectives and sensible 
bounds. Harrald, 2006, agrees with this overall concept: 
The initial response is conducted by resources on the ground reacting to 
the situation created by the event, while external resources are mobilized. 
An integration phase is required to structure these resources into a 
functioning organization capable of identifying needs and providing 
services that are beyond the capability and capacity of the early 
responders. If the mobilization and integration are successful, a production 
phase is reached where the response organization is fully productive, 
delivering needed services as a matter of routine. (p. 260) 
As stated earlier, ICS has shown to be effective in a variety of incidents. The 
often untold story is that in each of these incidents there was an initial and emergent 
response until the overhead staff could be set up and gather enough information to 
operate. For example, during the response to the Oklahoma City bombing the command 
personnel from the Oklahoma City Fire Department acknowledged that they did not have 
control of the incident during the first forty-five minutes when a threat of a secondary 
device occurred. Then, they pulled all responders out of the building and had the 
opportunity to regroup. This provided a break in the incident, so that the UC could be 
established (OKC, 1996, p. 25). The UC then imposed an organization that was the basis 
of the rest of the incident. It was during this first forty-five minutes; however, that the 
preponderance of rescues was made and care was given (OKC, 1996). The response to 
the Pentagon on 9/11 is another ICS success story (National Commission on Terrorist 
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Attacks, 2004, pp. 314–315). Again, there was a tremendous emergent response, in spite 
of the control and accountability that inherently occurs as a result of responding to a 
secure location, such as the Pentagon (Moynihan, 2007, p. 18). 
Drabek and McEntire address emergence:  
…disaster sociologists have repeatedly questioned the value of the 
bureaucratic model (Britton 1989a, p. 15; Drabek 1987, p. 290). They 
recognize that disaster foster emergent norms (Neal and Phillips 1995, p. 
329), that emergence is not an aberration (Wenger 192, p. 10, 12), that 
emergent behavior cannot be stopped (Neal and Phillips1995, p. 334) that 
emergent activity fills a void as a resource (Mileti 1989, p. 66) and not a 
liability. (Wenger 1992, pp. 10–12, 2002, p. 203) 
The emergent behavior and norm approach to emergency management is 
also beneficial in that it illustrates that there is more than one way to 
organize (Britton 1989a, p. 15), that there is order even in chaos (Koehler 
1996; Mileti 1989, p. 63), that existing social structure is effective (Dynes 
1994, p. 149), and that there is continuity before and after disaster (Dynes 
1994, 2002, p. 203) 
When a catastrophic incident occurs, it does not wear a sign that says this is a 
“Type X” incident, and it needs this type of organization and response (NRF 2008, p. 8) 
(Comfort 2007, p. 189). It may occur as an immense series of individual calls for 
assistance, or a scattered response. The incident is very dynamic at this point and minutes 
mean the difference between life and death. Individual resources focus on taking direct 
actions to resolve situations that they are responding to or happen upon—situations that 
responders cannot and will not pass. This portion of an incident is often anything but 
resembling a command and control environment. Resources are scattered and possibly 
physically separated. Communications, which may already be poor, may also be 
hampered by damage to infrastructure. In extreme cases, as found in New Orleans after 
Hurricane Katrina, communication capabilities were all but nonexistent (Moynihan, 
2007, p. 19).  
The process of bringing “order out of chaos”35 is a tough one. The dilemma lies 
in that each of the resources is doing good things. Stopping their work to regroup may 
                                                 
35 As a side note, “Order Out of Chaos” was a the name of an early (ca. 1990) video tape that was part 
of the National Fire Academy ICS Curriculum. 
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cost lives or property. But, stopping and reorganizing may save more in the long run—
and enhance safety. It is difficult to know which is right. This is a push-pull dilemma that 
happens on both sides—the responders and the UC. For an IC and other officials to let a 
chaotic response continue can be political suicide. Responders are trained to fix things. 
One side needs to get information and form an organization, and the other side is taking 
action to save lives. All too often, the failure of command occurs due to a command and 
control attitude on the part of agency leaders and agency administrators. In some cases, 
the question of “who’s in charge?” becomes a point of contention and argument. It can 
also be an issue if the current IC or unified commander cannot give the right answers to 
administrators and politicians. A scenario such as this, which could quickly become a 
human resource issue, can further drive the feeling in the UC to “get control” of the 
situation.  
With the description of the initial response above, the development of a top-down 
ICS is ineffective. The inexperienced IC and/or an IC who is an ICS “purist” will try to 
force command (top-down) over this situation (Drabek & McEntire, 2002, p. 203). The 
astute IC will lead what is already occurring and support their efforts (bottom-up) while 
preparing to layer in an overhead organization (Drabek & McEntire, 2002, p. 215). 
Assuming that a UC is in place, or a delegation of command has occurred to one 
person, how does an IC go about building a bottom-up response? ICS courses, in their 
current state, do not adequately address this. They speak of ICS as a top-down system 
that starts with an IC. In a sense, that is correct. There is technically an IC at each 
location—someone is in charge of each action responders take, even if it is only one 
responder. To begin layering in an organization over current operating forces, the IC 
must perform an assessment. This assessment must include a “best guess” inventory of 
current operating forces and a very limited description of the functions and tasks they are 
performing. There will be resources operating that an IC may not know about. The IC/UC 
may even have to send runners to find out what units are even there. From experience, the 
author will note that they all have to come up for air at some time. Even the sneakiest 
first responders will need water, food, or fuel at some point. As they are contacted or 
discovered, the IC can include them. Then, the IC develops an organization based either 
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geographically or functionally on the operating forces. Through multiple iterations, the 
assessment and inventory will become more accurate. It is important to note that the 
purpose at this stage is not to command resources, but rather to coordinate, support, and 
provide for their safety. 
Along with the IC’s assessment of the current operating and responding forces, he 
or she must also account for any other known objectives or tasks that need accomplished 
and take these into account when building an organization. There will always be more 
objectives and tasks than the IC can accomplish simultaneously. The IC goes through a 
process of prioritization based on the standard incident priorities of 1) life safety, 2) 
incident stabilization, and 3) property conservation. 
The damage assessment and development of objectives may take some time. 
During this period, the IC can build the organization using the resources already 
operating and those responding. The IC may also begin to realize the resources he or she 
will need, and he/she can order those resources at this time. Developing an organization 
from already operating forces consists of determining the type of command template the 
IC/unified commander will use. The key here is the IC/UC works through the list of 
resources and their current status. From this, the IC/UC uses ICS conventions to build an 
organizational chart starting with the bottom of the chart, as opposed to starting with the 
top. The span of control and perceived extent of the incident will dictate the organization; 
the organization must emerge out of the situation.  
As each resource is put into ICS assignments, they must be notified, so they may 
begin using the chain of command, and so the organization maintains unity of command. 
Depending on the communications and interoperability capabilities, it may take radio 
messages, mobile phone calls, or even sending runners to make assignment 
communications, as well as gain status reports. Prior ICS training is critical for this to 
work, so that when an assignment is made, each person knows what that means in terms 
of taking action, reporting through the chain of command, and documenting their actions. 
The intent is to have a perfectly running organization, but it cannot always happen. It is 
not like a TV episode where everything works out…it is not like sitting in a classroom 
and doing scenarios. 
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Operating in a bottom-up mode takes trust and flexibility. Moynihan concurs that 
trust is essential in facilitating coordination (Moynihan 2008, pp. 218–219). 
Subsequently, as the organization evolves from a bottom-up, or more open style, of 
organization to a more scalar, hierarchical organization, the need for trust diminishes 
(Moynihan, 2008, p. 219). Since the initial stages of disasters and catastrophic incidents 
are marked by chaos, the IC must have blind trust in order to make critical assignments to 
resources and people with which he/she may have no prior association. 
Flexibility is key to ICS in general, but especially when operating in the bottom-
up mode. Flexibility will be addressed in Chapter IV, Policy Option C. It is important to 
note here that during the initial stages IC may have to come up with “out-of-the-box” 
solutions to complex problems, even though those solutions do not always fit the 
“normal” ICS conventions. One example of this was during the Oklahoma City bombing. 
In a 1996 presentation by Fire Chief Gary Marrs, he discussed the scenario. The city of 
Oklahoma City was most concerned with rescue. The FBI had a tremendous stake in the 
crime scene. When all was said and done, they created two commands: One for the 
search and rescue effort, lead by Oklahoma City; and one for the crime scene, led by the 
FBI. This organization was set up very early in the incident, and it was not a contentious 
move. Rather, it was an operational move. The separate commands worked together. 
Chief Marrs discussed that they did not do it exactly by the book, but it worked. 
C. POLICY OPTION A—CONCLUSION 
Policy Option A—Acknowledge the bottom-up response that occurs when 
implementing ICS at major incidents: Modify ICS and NIMS training and 
implementation to change the ethos of ICS from a top-down system to a bottom-up 
system during the initial stages of a major incident. Emphasize the importance of the 
phase of major incidents that begins with its occurrence and ends with the beginning of 
the first operational period 
ICS refers to itself as a “top-down” system of management where objectives are 
orchestrated by a traditional, scalar command structure (NIMS, 2008). ICS should be 
modified to recognize the initial stages of catastrophic incidents and disasters. Incident 
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management success is more likely when command personnel acknowledge the “bottom-
up,” or self-organizing system that naturally occurs during the initial stages. The 
underlying lesson plans and curriculum should be adjusted to recognize and address the 
initial stages and the emerging part of the response to disasters and catastrophic incidents. 
This critical period is when most victims are saved and most property is protected. Once 
commanders acknowledge this portion of the response, they can take it into account as 
part of their planning for the sustained response. It is the IC/UCs job to support the 
efforts of responders in the initial stages while developing an action plan for a sustained 
response. The results of this recommendation will help prevent the consequences seen 
with management failures in the past, as well as provide for a better transition to an IMT 
at later stages of an incident.  
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IV. POLICY OPTION B –FLEXIBILITY IN ICS: EMPHASIZE 
INDIVIDUALITY AND LOCALITY 
Fellas, you know what the definition of an expert is? Someone fifty miles 
away from home carrying a briefcase. –Wayne Lehew, ca. 1994 
When you wake up groggy from your cot one morning and step into the 
command trailer, almost running into the governor…then you step outside 
for a cup of coffee and the President Pro-Tempore of the State Senate is 
asking you pointed questions – you’ll realize real quick that ICS needs to 
be flexible and account for individual and local circumstances. They don’t 
care if you call the truck full of water a “tanker” or “tender.” –Author 
A. RECOMMENDATION 
Emphasize the ethos of flexibility in ICS application, considering the concepts of 
individuality and locality in incident response frameworks. 
B. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
The National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland, began teaching the ICS as 
a nation-wide system in 1983 (Cole, 2000, p. 209). Although there was some 
participation from other first response agencies, prior to 9/11, ICS was primarily a fire 
service tool (Cole, 2000, pp. 209–210; Jensen, 2010, pp. 18–19; Hannestad, 2005, p. 19). 
Certainly, it was not a nationwide phenomenon, as it is today. Local emergency managers 
and many law enforcement agencies followed the fire service (Hannestad, 2005, pp. 19–
20; Cole, 2000, pp. 209–210).  
In response to firefighter deaths and injuries, the National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA) issued the first edition of NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department 
Occupational Health and Safety Programs in 1987. (NFPA, 1987). NFPA 1500 
recommendations stimulated sweeping safety changes in the fire service. Among these  
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changes was the use of an incident management system for all incidents36 (NFPA, 1987). 
This was stated in NFPA 1500 and in the ICS Texts of that era. Not only was flexibility a 
requirement, it was a selling point.  
During the early years of proliferation across the nation, ICS implementation was 
met with resistance37 from much of nation’s fire service. Many fire chiefs in that era (as 
well as firefighters) came on the job during the days when the fire service ran on the 
principle of “he who yells the loudest is in charge of the fire scene.” ICS was a hard sell 
for these folks. The author remembers many of their comments. “You can’t fight fire with 
a clipboard,” “We don’t have enough people to leave someone in the command post be 
in-charge—everybody has to work…,” “We don’t have enough people to fill all of those 
boxes,” and a multitude of others. An emphasis on flexibility was key in showing that 
using ICS did not always mean using every position on the standard chart shown in the 
slides and text. ICS was supposed to fit the incident, the incident was not supposed to fit 
ICS. ICS was to consider the individuality and locality of the incident. Harrald, 2006, 
states “Comfort has shown (1999) that the creative ability of response organizations to 
become adaptive networks has been a notable factor in determining the relative success 
of response and relief operations (Harrald, 2006, p. 265).” One of the most basic 
requirements of an incident management system is that it be flexible (Dynes 1994, p. 149; 
Neal & Phillips 1995, p. 328 in Drabek & McEntire, 2002, p. 204). 
One of the terms in the original NFA ICS manuals was “Real World ICS.” The 
course took students through the process of setting up a command for several everyday 
incidents. It showed them how to form a simple organizational structure that addressed 
the needs of the incident. These scenarios taught many firefighters the foundation of ICS. 
The need for “Real World ICS” still applies today. According to Moynihan, 2007, “An 
after-action review of the Pentagon attack on 9/11 highlights the need for research to 
‘incorporate real world experiences drawn from such events as Oklahoma City, the 
World Trade Center, and the Pentagon’ (p. 10).” 
                                                 
36 As a rookie firefighter at the time, the author distinctly remembers that era. It was when firefighters 
had to stop riding tailboards of fire trucks, wear bunker pants instead of fold down rubber boots, and start 
using ICS. 
37 This is putting it very nicely. 
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In today’s world where responders take their building block ICS courses by 
reading repurposed PowerPoint slides on a computer screen, (instead of learning from a 
real, live, experienced instructor) the emphasis on ICS flexibility is missing. There is still 
a version of ICS “for the Fire Service,” but event in this course, the section on “Real 
World ICS” is gone. The little discussion of flexibility that does exist in ICS courses 
refers to scalability. Harrald, 2006, concurs “Since its creation in 2002, the DHS has 
focused on increasing the discipline in the national system through an extensive 
development of doctrine, process, and structure and has neglected fostering the agility 
(creativity, adaptability, improvisation) that has historically been the key to success (p. 
270).” Harrald further states, 
Dynes (1994, 2000) demonstrated that the assumptions inherent in closed 
system, command and control organizational models have been absent in 
the aftermath of almost all natural and technological disasters. The closed 
system model (which Dynes termed the “military model”) assumes 
environmental chaos and the need for command, control, and centralized 
decision making. The open-system, problem-solving model assumes an 
environment that supports continuity and recovery and a need for 
coordination, cooperation, and decentralized decision making. Other 
researchers have noted that structured planning and organization were 
only effective if the ability to improvise is preserved. (2006, p. 264) 
There seems to be good discussion in the NRF, NIMS, and ICS about scalability. 
Scalability is tied to the “modular organization” property of ICS. Modular organization is 
the ability to grow or shrink by adding standardized components of the system. 
Flexibility in the context of this thesis is not so much referring to scalability, but rather 
flexibility in the sense of adaptation and improvisation. In Chapter II, Literature Review, 
Harrald’s Organizational Typology of Response Organizations referred to an 
organizational type called a “Balanced/Adaptive” organization (Harrald, 2006, p. 268). 
“Balanced/Adaptive” systems have the strengths of a “Bureaucratic/Procedural” 
organization, but they differ in that they have the ability to rapidly adjust to 
circumstances and other coordinating organizations (Harrald, 2006, p. 268). NIMS has 
shown to be more of a “Bureaucratic/Procedural” policy according to Harrald’s typology 
(Harrald, 2006, p. 268).  
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By flexibility, this document is referring to the local jurisdiction’s ability to forge 
an overhead organization around a dynamic operation. Flexibility in this context refers to 
the emphasis on discretion in developing a structure that addresses each incident 
individually. Students of ICS should be taught that there is no “pure” ICS. Hence, the two 
properties discussed by this thesis—individuality and locality. Chapter II, Literature 
Review, discussed the bottom-up response that occurs in the initial stages of a disaster or 
catastrophic incident. Included in this discussion was the concept of SOSs. Two tenants 
of SOSs are individuality and locality (Decker, 2001, p. 2). It is the author’s contention 
that addressing these two tenants of SOSs through flexibility will encourage the self-
organization of the incident response, thereby, easing the transition from the initial stages 
of an incident to the sustained response.  
Each locality and jurisdiction is unique. In today’s ICS courses, there seems to be 
more emphasis on the charts, forms, and checklists than there is on implementing a useful 
and local command. Flexibility, in this case, is not referring to purging the ICS manuals 
of any concepts. Instead, the author’s contention is that there needs to be an emphasis, 
understanding, and expectation that ICS will not always easily fit what responders need 
to accomplish. Hence, it should not be a sticking point in keeping them from doing what 
they need to do. 
It seems that today we have come to a push-pull relationship in ICS and NIMS. It 
is a common impression that when ICS is implemented, people and organizations become 
robotic in nature, executing orders and functions at the will of the IC. In a sense, ICS is a 
command and control system. It is more than that, however. The push-pull that occurs 
when field units are working is that they feel they cannot do anything without being told, 
even though they may see and know what to do. A second push-pull relationship occurs 
when an IC is compelled to stand-up management assignments in the organization when 
he/she does not need them. For instance, in the early stages of a disaster, when bodies are 
short, an IC may feel compelled to set up a finance section or a logistics section, but 
he/she really does not need one. No money is changing hands, logistics are handled 
through normal dispatching and supply procedures for his/her organization. The IC can 
 61 
handle these functions by him or herself. But, all of the ICS courses, all of the scenarios, 
have lent themselves, or pushed students to full section implementation.  
One of the cliché sayings in incident management is “all incidents start local and 
end local.” Local people know the local nuances. They know the people. They know the 
terrain. The fact that there is a national system does not mean adjoining jurisdictions get 
along, or ever will. Forster found the failure to harvest local knowledge to be a key 
failure point in the response to the Beslan, North Ossetia (Russia) School hostage 
situation:  
At Beslan, local assistance and expertise was disregarded. To be effective 
security forces need to be cognizant that, as in combat, terrorist situations 
have a “fog of war” surrounding them. Effective use of intelligence is 
needed to lift the “fog” to the greatest extent possible. This is 
accomplished by utilizing all available resources. Local resources can be 
particularly valuable in data fusion because they are familiar with the 
environment. Furthermore, effective  incident command requires  
flexibility  in  the planning and execution of operations, not only  to 
respond  to unexpected events at  the incident but also to achieve a level of 
control ensuring official actions are not overtaken by outside events (as 
occurred with the vigilantism at Beslan). Finally, lessons learned at the 
tactical level may be applied to prevention as well as response. “All 
response is local” is the mantra of American emergency response. (2006, 
p. 6) 
The question the author raises here is do we need to provide a framework that 
assists the local jurisdiction, or do we need to control how local jurisdictions are doing 
their job? Put bluntly, is NIMS overshadowing the real need? If that is the case, we are 
ICSing our way out of their hearts.  
The American emergency response community is a very diverse group. The 
United States has a very pluralistic government. Further, we have an interwoven mix of 
agencies and jurisdictions. As put by Morag (2011), “While we may view the above 
policy areas as constituting the field of Homeland Security in the United States, one 
would be hard-pressed to find any similar amalgamation of what would appear to be 
disparate policy domains in the rest of the world (p. 12).” There is no central authority 
that dictates the make-up of United States first responder organizations. Even within 
disciplines; such as fire, police, emergency medical services, there is no true 
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standardization. For example, the emergency medical service is standardized in training 
by the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians, but there are states that do 
not participate or recognize reciprocity. Similar systems exist for police and fire. As far 
as equipment, there is no “standard” fire truck. There are standards, but there is not a 
“standard” one. They come in all shapes and sizes, and they may carry some or much of 
the same equipment. In general, they meet some of the same purposes or minimum 
requirements, but there are local and regional differences. These local and regional 
differences are deep rooted, and they may not be something that a fire or police chief can 
change. There are issues in funding, issues with labor contracts, and issues with what 
services a jurisdiction has decided to provide to their citizens. This is the part of ICS and 
NIMS where there just will not be consensus. Jensen, 2010, found similar results 
indicating that policy characteristics, implementer views, and local capacity were 
indicative of a jurisdiction’s intended NIMS implementation behavior (p. 95). Further, 
she found that interorganizational characteristics were found to influence actual 
implementation behavior (Jensen, 2010, p. 95). These are the hang-up areas where 
jurisdictions are saying, “this just will not work here,” or “we don’t have that.” Everyone 
cannot have unlimited personnel, satellite phones, hardened facilities, redundancy of 
systems, etc.; and providing a nonsustaining pot of money through a competitive grant 
process does not fund the NIMS mandates of standardization. 
Cognition is one factor in flexibility. Comfort, 2007, found that cognition was one 
of several factors in successful crisis management:  
Cognition is the triggering insight of emerging risk that initiates the 
emergency response process. Without cognition, the other components of 
emergency management remain static or disconnected and, as shown by 
the record of operations during Hurricane Katrina, often lead to 
cumulative failure. The relation between cognition and action transforms 
emergency management from a static, rule-bound set of procedures into a 
dynamic process, one that is based on the human capacity to learn, 
innovate, and adapt to changing conditions, informed by timely, valid 
data. (Comfort, 2007, p. 189) 
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Comfort’s findings tie together the concepts of cognition and flexibility, or the 
ability to adapt to the local conditions of the incident. Interestingly enough, the NRF 
makes a similar claim: 
It is not always obvious at the outset whether a seemingly minor event 
might be the initial phase of a larger, rapidly growing threat. The 
Framework incorporates standardized organizational structures that 
promote on-scene initiative, innovation, and sharing of essential resources 
drawn from all levels of government, NGOs, and the private sector. 
Response must be quickly scalable, flexible, and adaptable. (NRF, 2008, 
p. 8) 
Hence, the recognition of a need(s), the adapting the organization to the need(s) is 
the crux of flexibility. 
Beyond cognition, how does flexibility occur? One important aspect is local 
planning. The author contends that even as far back as the early days of ICS in the Fire 
Service; ICS has taken the place of preparedness for many organizations. The impression 
by many was that implementing ICS would solve any disaster that came their way. Kreps, 
however, states that “Without preparedness, emergency management loses clarity and 
efficiency in meeting external disaster related demands (1991, p. 33, in Harrald 2006, p. 
264). He further indicates that preparedness and improvisation go hand in hand (Kreps 
1991, p. 33, in Harrald 2006, p. 264). Hence, organizations must continue planning and 
preparedness efforts. Then, when disasters and catastrophic incidents occur, ICS is a tool 
that should allow the flexibility and improvisation needed. With ICS, organizations can 
execute the parts of their response plan that are applicable and adapt plans to the areas 
where they must react to a dynamic environment. Kreps adds, “Without improvisation, 
emergency management loses flexibility in the face of changing conditions (Kreps 1991, 
p. 33, in Harrald 2006, p. 264).” Further, according to Harrald, 2006, “Kendra and 
Wachtendorf (2002) saw improvisation as the combination of planning and creativity 
when meeting unexpected situations or unexpected constraints (p. 264).” 
Planning leads to preparedness. Preparedness can be in the areas of hardware, 
personnel, and policies. Having plans, even general plans, is similar to having previous 
experiences in recognition primed decision making. Even though the previous 
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experience, or plan, may not fit the disaster or catastrophic incident, they can be drawn 
upon for certain aspects that fit the current situation. This is improvisation.  
Authors recognize the need for planning, and that it does not impede flexibility. 
Mendonca et al., states: 
Activation of emergency plans is based upon assessment of the potential 
impacts of an accident and the courses of action needed to eliminate or at 
least mitigate this impact. These response plans can rarely be executed as 
expected, as the case of the Exxon Valdez accident showed [1]. Flexible 
approaches to emergency management are therefore required. Any such 
approach must be able to deal with an uncertain and changing 
environment and allow for revision of planned courses of action. 
Moreover, the approach must be able to support emergency managers in 
improvising when no standard operating procedure can alleviate the 
catastrophe. (Mendonca et al., p. 31) 
One of the common areas where disaster plans are altered is the assignment of 
specific personnel to specific positions. Comfort concludes that, 
In actual events, personnel with assigned responsibilities may not be 
available, their capacity to act may be reduced by damaged infrastructure, 
or their resources and experience may be inadequate to respond to the 
conditions they face. The capacity for adaptation to a suddenly altered or 
rapidly changing environment is critical for effective performance. This 
capacity still depends on the critical functions of cognition, 
communication, coordination, and control, but it needs to be understood in 
a new way. (Comfort 2007, p. 193) 
Therefore, effective planning considers these circumstances, and personnel are 
trained to expect and work through them. 
Prior to 9/11, the fire service adapted ICS to all kinds of incidents. It was not a 
direct fit to every type of incident or responder discipline. Some significant incidents saw 
great success, others did not. ICS was not always the reason for these successes, nor was 
the lack of an ICS always the reason for failures. When an organization has experience in 
an area for a great deal of time, they learn how to adapt and make it work. One of the 
main issues with ICS; however, has been the fire service emphasis and the integration of 
nonfire agencies (Cole, 2000, p. 212). The author agrees that all pertinent agencies need 
to be integrated equally, but the point here is that maybe there is an opportunity to learn 
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from the fire service’s experiences with twenty-five plus years of ICS use. In some areas, 
such as with some of the original FIRESCOPE agencies, their experience has been on the 
order of forty years. Moynihan concurs,  
Firefighters have extensive experience in the use of the ICS, albeit within 
the function of firefighting, and other emergency responders at all levels 
of government are just beginning to catch up, even as they consider how 
the ICS might be applied in different situations. Responders have scant 
careful analysis upon which to base such training. (2007, p. 10) 
Since Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 was issued, requiring a national 
incident management system, there has been a tremendous surge in the number of 
personnel from varied types of organizations trained in NIMS. Consider the environment 
where an organization has not embraced ICS, but is now required to implement ICS. At 
the same time, they are under the gun to get grant proposals submitted to get their piece 
of the hundreds of millions of dollars of newly found Homeland Security grant money. 
As part of the grant requirements, their whole organization, not just the fire or police 
department, but the preponderance of their local government must be “NIMS 
Compliant.” The result is a massive training effort in a relatively short time. Many of the 
courses are online courses. In short, the focus has been on the training and checking the 
boxes versus ensuring a quality response. In this mix, flexibility has not been a key 
concept that has been taught. Compliance has been (Jensen, 2009, pp. 22–23). Jensen, 
2010 concurs with the potential for the separation of complying with the NIMS training 
mandates and the actual knowledge level of the student: 
As Jensen (2009) determined in a recent study of NIMS, although the 
federal government attempts to monitor the progress local jurisdictions 
make toward complying with NIMS, its measures of compliance do not 
reflect the knowledge about NIMS of those involved, the commitment of 
those involved, their actual incorporation of NMS into their day-to-day 
activities, or how appropriate NIMS is for a given jurisdiction. (p. 22)  
During training, the flexibility component can quickly be lost. This is a failure of 
the training curriculum to properly emphasize the modular organization—and thus 
flexible nature—of the system. Flexibility in this context does not mean changing the 
systems, rather allowing the modular system to fit the incident. A recent example of this 
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occurred in an L-449, ICS Curricula Train-the-Trainer, course taught by the Center for 
Domestic Preparedness in March of 2010. This was a course of seasoned response 
professionals. The instructor for the course, not an emergency responder, mentioned 
again and again, if it is not in the lesson plan, you cannot teach it. This was an obvious 
attempt to circumvent the minority of instructors who would modify the system; 
however, the atmosphere in the course was not one that emphasized that ICS is flexible. 
Rather, the air was one of “this is how the government says this will be done, and if you 
are going to teach this, you have to teach it this way.” The fact that this instructor trainer 
was not a responder is an important issue being brought out by this section.  
Experience does come in to play in flexibility. Experienced practitioners are able 
to draw on what worked and what did not work in the past. Lacking experience, an 
instructor or administrator has the policy to turn to for guidance. According to Comfort, 
2007: 
Recognition-primed decision making (Klein, Orasanu, & Calderwood, 
1993; Salas & Klein 2001 ) is now incorporated into many training 
programs for emergency personnel. Klein’s concept of recognition-primed 
decision making acknowledges that, under threat, the process of reasoning 
through a linear set of instructions or rules is far too slow for human 
managers to avoid danger. Rather, he observed that experienced leaders 
draw on a repertoire of previous actions in similar conditions and create 
workable strategies to fit the existing context for action more 
appropriately. (2007, p. 191) 
ICS and NIMS are heralded as being flexible (NFA, 1988, p. SM-18; NIMS 2008, 
p. 6). ICS is organized modularly and may be seen as flexible. Modular organization 
implies that portions of the system can be implemented as needed, and that only the parts 
that are needed will be used (NIMS, 2008, p. 47). According to FEMA, 
Flexibility and adaptability are ICS strengths that are frequently 
mentioned in the literature. For example, FEMA training materials point 
out that while the ICS concept was originally devised to address complex 
wildfire scenarios in California, it has subsequently proven flexible 
enough for managing any type of emergency, including floods, hurricanes, 
earthquakes, hazardous material releases, riots, and other natural and 
human-caused emergency incidents (1992). (Cole, 2000, pp. 211–212) 
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While the NRF supports the same concepts as authors who are calling for 
adaptation, innovation, improvisation, and other similar concepts, the NRF, NIMS, and 
ICS are considered by many as inflexible. Responders use ICS for a range of incidents. 
As a whole, ICS concepts fit what responders do. In the sense that ICS is scalable to fit 
the size of an incident, it is very flexible. However, in the area of being flexible as a 
policy, it is not. Therefore, policy implementation is another area where this thesis 
recommends an emphasis in flexibility. 
ICS is meant to be a tool, not a burden. Jensen found that many county emergency 
managers used a pick and choose mentality when implementing NIMS (2010, p. 23). 
Some of the common areas that are sticking points are certain terms (such as “sector” and 
“tanker/tender”), the use of ten-codes, and the ICS forms. There are others. The point is 
that if an organization can use ICS as the tool it is meant to be, at least in spirit, they 
should feel confident in their decision to do so. If they have regional terminology (or 
other) differences they can work out through local and even regional disaster planning, 
they should not be undermined by a state or federal government (or a NIMS instructor). 
According to Jensen,  
The local level handles the average incident in the United States and 
interactions with the state and/or federal government during most 
incidents are minimal if any. If standardization of emergency management 
structures, processes, and terminology were lacking within the impacted 
jurisdiction, it may very well go unnoticed by the state and/or federal 
government. Moreover, any modifications made in implementing NIMS 
would not negatively influence any organization or jurisdiction outside of 
the local jurisdiction impacted by the incident (e.g., a neighboring county). 
(2010, pp. 98–99) 
and, 
Large-scale disasters happen where the most effective and efficient 
response requires the quick integration and joint effort of organizations, 
jurisdictions, and levels of government to address the impacts and needs 
related to the incident. In these situations, the absence of an organizing 
mechanism such as NIMS would be noticed when organizations, 
jurisdictions, and levels of government attempt to separately address the 
impacts and needs related to the incident with their own, individualized 
emergency management system or no system at all, as appeared to be the 
case during Hurricane Katrina. (Neal & Webb, 2006, 2010, p. 110) 
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Thus, it is the contention of this author that it is more important that organizations 
are attempting to implement NIMS, and more importantly, ICS, in a way that they can 
use it in a way that prevents management failures seen in the past than it is to make sure 
that they are procedurally correct in every way. 
C. POLICY OPTION B—CONCLUSION 
Policy Option B—Emphasize the ethos of flexibility in ICS application, 
considering the concepts of individuality and locality in incident response frameworks. 
Specific recommendations include: 
1. Encourage ICS practitioners to consider the individuality and locality of 
incidents and their region when applying ICS. 
 
2. ICS should be taught by truly experienced practitioners who can show 
students how ICS can be flexible, allow for improvisation, and adapt to 
meet the needs of a dynamic incident. 
 
3. Reconsider who really needs ICS training, and focus on training the right 
responders, right.  
The organizational systems that respond to extreme events must be open 
systems that allow information to be gathered from and transmitted to the 
public and nongovernmental organizations in addition to standard 
governmental sources. They must promote distributed decision making 
and improvisation in the face of unexpected events or conditions. (Harrald, 
2006, p. 270)  
Since the adoption of NIMS as the system of choice for nationally significant 
incidents, the focus is on IMTs and full implementation of ICS, rather than a flexible 
implementation based on the conditions of the incident or disaster. This section 
recommends emphasizing flexibility in the implementation of ICS as a policy and during 
incident response. Incident management should address the individuality and locality of 
an incident in an effort to take advantage of the local resources and nuances that exist. 
This will contribute to the self-organizing aspects of the initial response and aid in the 
transition to the sustained response. 
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V. POLICY OPTION C—AGENCY DESIGNATIONS 
A. RECOMMENDATION 
Distinguish between jurisdictional and other types of agencies in ICS Training 
and Implementation. Focus on the role of the Liaison Officer and the EOC role in 
relieving and reducing the burden of “All-Hazard” inclusiveness on the UC. 
B. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
If we did not have such a thing as an airplane today, we would probably 
create something the size of N.A.S.A. to make one. –H. Ross Perot 
My experience with emergency managers, FEMA and NIMS leads me to 
believe that these people and systems are good at inclusiveness, building 
teams from people with diverse interests and backgrounds. [But] I have 
seen this ‘management by committee’ approach cripple response 
flexibility and efficiency. –Chris Bellavita, 2010 
Multi-agency and multi-jurisdiction incidents were a driving force behind the 
development and adoption of ICS and NIMS. Since 9/11, great strides have been made in 
the area of incident command. The current system in the U.S. is considered to be an all-
hazard approach. There has been an effort toward agency inclusiveness and coordination 
in the UC. One area of UC that has become obscured with the recent all-hazard approach 
to ICS is the determination of which agencies will be represented in the UC. An example 
of this occurred during a recent disaster in Tulsa, OK. The initial efforts to include the 
vast array of agencies in the UC ended up in confusion. Eventually, one of the officials 
took control of the situation, sent everyone out of the room, and started over with the key 
players. Did this hurt some feelings? Were there some agency representatives excluded 
who wanted to know what was going on in the command post? Yes, but it was not 
necessary for them to be part of the UC. It was adequate for many organizations to 
interface with the Liaison Officer or have a representative in the EOC. Similar scenarios 
have occurred in command posts across the country. This chapter recommends courses of 
action based on existing NIMS and ICS definitions that will assist with this issue. 
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In the switch to All-Hazard ICS and NIMS, there has been an effort to be 
inclusive of all disciplines in the response arena. Not only are the traditional jurisdictional 
agencies being trained in NIMS and ICS, but also agencies that would not have been 
considered in the past. The emphasis has been on coordination and communication, as 
well as building partnerships and networks. These networks and partnerships are a vital 
part of NIMS and ICS. There can, however, be confusion about the purposes of the UC 
and an EOC (Jensen, 2008, p. 7, 9). One of the issues that command posts face is the 
concept of “who really needs to be here?” Conversely, an issue that comes up in EOCs is 
“we really need someone from (fill in the blank).”  
Incidents that involve a single agency and a single jurisdiction are called single 
command incidents. The determination of who will be the IC on single command 
incidents is usually quite simple. Most organizations specify this in some form of written 
procedure. When incidents involve more than one agency or extend beyond one 
jurisdiction, responders use a UC. Instead of there being a person in charge of the 
incident, there is a small group of people who are decision-making representatives for 
each agency and jurisdiction involved in the incident (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2008, pp. 3–13). The group appoints a spokesperson to carry forward the orders 
and decisions of the UC (NRT, pp. 13–14). The spokesperson is usually the 
representative from the agency with the greatest operational stake at that phase of the 
incident (NRT, pp. 13–14). Note that the representative from this organization is not the 
IC, but rather the spokesperson for the UC. The crux of the issue discussed here is the 
question “who really needs to be part of the unified command?” 
There is not an easy answer to the question “Who is in charge?,” or more 
accurately stated, “Who should be part of the unified command?”  As one can imagine, 
during the dynamic initial stages of an incident determining these agencies can be very 
difficult. Much room is left for political agendas, power mongering, and the like. There 
will be agencies that insist they are in charge, and there will be other agencies that will 
skirt the issue and try to not be part of the UC. There will also be agencies who want to 
be part of the UC, but they have no jurisdiction or interest. Further, there will be 
supporting agencies arrive who may not necessarily be part of the command and control 
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element, but have resources and special abilities that can help solve the incident. Lastly, 
there may be agencies that jurisdictionally or strategically need to be part of the UC, but 
no one has thought to include them. (Lindell, 2006, p. 33) 
When the fire service was the primary steward of ICS, the answer was often quite 
clear. The local fire service ran the incident in consultation with the other government 
organizations—or sometimes without (Cole 2000, pp. 209–210; Hannestad 2005, p. 23). 
Some areas had a true UC, and some did not. This system was the norm for many years 
from the early 1970s through the time when HSPD-5 and HSPD-8 were issued in 2003. 
With the current all-hazard approach to ICS, the pendulum has swung far to the other 
side. Instead of one agency running the response, the approach has been to include all 
possible government and nongovernment entities as part of the UC (ICMA, 2008, p. 39). 
As a result of this emphasis, a host of new agencies are attending NIMS and ICS 
courses of all levels. Hence, they are carrying away the expectation that they are needed 
in the command post. There are two issues here. First, this adds to the load of the UC and 
to the confusion in the command post during the first portions of the incident. It has been 
the author’s experience that superfluous agencies soon figure out the low actual need for 
their presence and their attendance at the command post wanes as time goes on. 
Obviously, this is not an effective way to filter out UC agencies, as it can alienate those 
agencies. A second issue occurs when misplaced expectations result in agency 
representatives attending unnecessary training. Time is wasted, and inaccurate 
expectations can be created. One of the expectations that can be construed is that all 
agencies are supposed to operate using ICS. This is just not true for all agencies. Many 
NGOs, VOADs, and private entities, for example, have their own response plans and 
operational methodologies (Drabek & McEntire, 2002, p. 215). They want to help, and 
they want to coordinate in any way possible, but, they do not need to try to fit ICS into 
their way of life. They have a need for awareness, not an innate knowledge. 
When every possible organization has a representative in the UC, the group size 
can easily grow to a point where it is ineffective. In the United States, it would not be 
uncommon for the UC to approach twenty people or greater when one considers each 
aspect of local, tribal, and state law enforcement, emergency medical services, fire 
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service, public health, emergency management, and other agencies. Literature reveals 
various results on the recommendations for the effective number of committee or work 
group numbers. The graphic representation of the UC rotating triangle points to a group 
size of three. Obviously, this would not be inclusive enough for even the smallest of 
disasters. Interestingly enough NIMS and ICS define the span of control for one 
supervisor as three to seven (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008, pp. 2–26). 
Research into business literature reveals mixed numbers. A couple of examples indicate 
ranges from seven to sixteen and nine to fifteen for committees or work groups. These 
numbers could easily bog down the UC. Each new article yields a different range. One 
source in particular stood out. A document published by the National Response Team 
called the ICS/UC Technical Assistance Document indicates that the make-up of the UC 
should be variable based on the incident, but the number of representatives in the UC 
should be kept as small as possible (NRT, p. 12).  
Several authors provide insight into the issues with coordination and stakeholders 
during a disaster response. Christopher Bellavita puts it most simply  
My DoD [colleagues] have acknowledged that [operations in the United 
States] are more complicated than overseas operations in some ways. 
Given our pluralistic governance, ICS allows for unified command (UC); 
emergencies don’t respect geographic or regulatory jurisdiction. UC has 
particular requirements. Members of a UC must have jurisdiction, funding 
to contribute and authority to speak and decide for their agency. Failing 
one of those, you’re [just] an agency representative. (2010) 
It is not the intent of ICS to command every organization and emergent 
organization out there (Drabek & McEntire, 2002, p. 215). Rather, the intent is 
coordination with these entities. ICS is for the government to manage its own response 
(Drabek & McEntire, 2002, p. 215). Each agency, whether public or private, still 
maintains its own authority, responsibility, and accountability (NRF, 2008, p. 10; Drabek 
& McEntire, 2002, p. 215). 
Drabek and McEntire acknowledge that one of the reasons coordination is 
difficult in a disaster is that some organizations do not understand how their agency fits 
in to the overall response effort. (2002, p. 207). Interviews conducted by Jensen indicated 
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that, “An additional issue noted by local EOC interviewees was that some people who 
were in the EOC and had no apparent formal role, or did not know what their role should 
be (2008, p. 9).” Lindell concurs, indicating that defining stakeholders is one of the 
problems inherent in complex emergency management (2006, p. 33). NIMS and ICS 
provide definitions that apply to stakeholder agencies. These definitions are incident 
specific and are based on the agency’s purpose at the incident. These definitions are one 
of the keys to managing the number of agencies that will be participating in the UC. 
NIMS and ICS define agencies as: 
A division of government with a specific function offering a particular 
kind of assistance. In the ICS (ICS), agencies are defined either as 
jurisdictional (having statutory responsibility for incident management) or 
as assisting or cooperating (providing resources or other assistance). 
Governmental organizations are most often in charge of an incident, 
though in certain circumstances private sector organizations may be 
included. Additionally NGOs may be included to provide support. 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008, p. 135) 
Agencies are further divided based on their jurisdiction or level of participation. 
The divisions are: 
Jurisdictional Agency: The agency having jurisdiction and responsibility 
for a specific geographical area, or a mandated function. 
Assisting Agency: An agency or organization providing personnel, 
services, or other resources to the agency with direct responsibility for 
incident management. See Supporting Agency. 
Cooperating Agency: An agency supplying assistance other than direct 
operational or support functions or resources to the incident management 
effort. 
Supporting Agency: An agency that provides support and/or resource 
assistance to another agency. See Assisting Agency. (Federal NIMS, 2008, 
pp. 135–149) 
The ICS definition of agencies indicates that they are a division of government; 
however, it further explains itself to include private agencies and nongovernmental 
organizations in some situations. Fire, law enforcement, emergency medical services, and 
in some cases public health have traditionally been the jurisdictional agencies. Other 
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agencies, like public works and nongovernmental organizations have traditionally been 
assisting, cooperating, or supporting agencies. As seen in recent times, these traditional 
roles are disappearing. The “all-hazard” aspect of NIMS calls for a determination based 
on the needs of the incident. 
The simple and pragmatic solution to this issue is that members who are delegated 
to be part of the UC by the agency administrator, or appointed as part of the UC by the 
IC, are part of the UC. The other agency representatives coordinate their agencies’ efforts 
through the Liaison Officer or provide a representative in the EOC. A key determination 
is to then make a designation of what type of agency each is—early in the incident. This 
determination sets the tone for agencies’ participation at the incident and helps to limit 
the number of agencies participating in the UC. In so much as possible, this should be 
part of continuing disaster planning, so that expectations are identified before the incident 
(Jensen, 2008, p. 2). 
Chapter III, Policy Option A, discussed the need to recognize the “bottom-up” 
response that occurs with disasters and catastrophic incidents. In recognizing this aspect, 
as well recognizing the need for flexibility discussed in Chapter IV, Policy Option B, the 
discussion here lends itself to the topic of coordination between organizations. NIMS and 
ICS have the frameworks to assist with coordination. However, frameworks and 
definitions do not mean much, if they are not implemented. Disaster planning and drills at 
the local level can define these relationships, but disasters have shown that plans, while 
very necessary, typically change when the real thing happens (Koehler, Kress & Miller 
2001, p. 295; Jensen, 2008, p. 3; Harrald, 2006, pp. 264–265). In the context of this 
discussion, despite anyone’s best planning, the arrangement of the UC will likely have to 
be set when the disaster occurs. In situations like this, implementation of a framework 
often rests in the hands of a leader. This is most effective when the leader has positional 
power, as well as a structured environment such as an EOC (Jensen, 2008, p. 2, 8).  
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C. POLICY OPTION C—CONCLUSION 
Policy Option C—Distinguish between jurisdictional and other types of agencies 
in ICS Training and Implementation. Focus on the role of the Liaison Officer and the 
EOC role in relieving and reducing the burden of “All-Hazard” inclusiveness on the UC.  
Specific recommendations include: 
1. Encourage the concept of regional UC planning. Regional planning and 
drills will allow agencies to continuously define their UC agencies. 
 
2. Training: Emphasize concepts contained in this chapter in revisions to 
current training programs.  
 
a) Expand the UC module of the current ICS-300 course to 
emphasize the definitions and roles of the various types of 
agencies.  
 
b) Develop an awareness section in the IS-70038 course. The NIMS 
Training Plan states, “Everyone involved in emergency 
management (to include emergency operation center personnel in 
support of the field), regardless of discipline or level of 
government, should take the NIMS baseline curriculum courses 
(Independent Study-700 and ICS-100 (2011, p. 7).”  
 
3. Develop a special online training course for representatives from agencies 
that are normally cooperating or supporting agencies (who are not required 
to take IS-700) that familiarizes them with ICS and their expected roles 
during an incident.  
 
The current system in the U.S. is considered to be an all-hazard approach, and 
there has been a tremendous effort toward agency inclusiveness and coordination in the 
UC. One area of UC that has become obscured with the recent all-hazard approach to ICS 
is the determination of which agencies will be represented in the UC. Whereas in the 
past, fire departments were almost exclusively put in charge of disasters and catastrophic 
incidents, now the pendulum has swung far to the side of inclusiveness in UC. This is 
significant because it directly affects the implementation of a UC or an EOC, and hence 
affects the success of ICS. Simply put, our light, simple, and agile commands are 
                                                 
38 IS-700: National Incident Management System (NIMS), An Introduction. 
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becoming committees and bureaucracies. There must be a change in the current practice 
of making all agencies equal partners in the command of disasters. Incidents are real, and 
they are dynamic. The number of key partners and decision makers needs to be limited to 
those agencies with jurisdictional authority. Cooperating agencies are vital to the 
response to disasters and catastrophic incidents; however, they should implement their 




During its forty-year history, ICS has become the prominent model for managing 
incident response in the United States (Cole, 2000, pp. 207–210; Hannestad, 2005, p. 21). 
In the mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s, ICS spread through the fire service primarily 
as a grass roots effort. After the events of 9/11, President George W. Bush issued 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), which codified ICS as part of a 
new national incident management system (NIMS, 2008). Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-5 incorporated a system with a successful history as a best practice 
for the country (NIMS, 2008). Best, or smart, practices are practices or from another area 
that are used in another (Bardach, 2009, Loc.1227/1891). Despite the previous successes 
of ICS, there has not been universal acceptance of the system and its overarching policy, 
NIMS (Jensen, 2010, p. 13, 18). This research examines the response aspect of disasters 
and other catastrophic incidents and considers ICS as a United States policy. The method 
of Policy Analysis is used to recommended solutions that will address issues that have 
hampered the implementation of ICS as part of the National Incident Management 
System. This chapter will examine each recommendation and explain trade-offs between 
the projected outcomes for each policy option.  
A. CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS/FAILURE 
1. Effectiveness 
Key among the criteria for any recommendation is effectiveness. Whether or not 
the change will make a difference and achieve the stated goal is the most important 
factor. There has significant controversy on the current effectiveness of NIMS. ICS is 
considered a smart practice, not a perfect, or even a best practice. The fact that the 
Homeland Security enterprise is unable to truly pinpoint the effectiveness of NIMS and 
ICS makes it difficult to pinpoint the effect that these policy options will have on future 
incident management efforts. 
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2. End User Acceptability 
With the issuance of Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, NIMS and ICS 
took the force of law. NIMS implementation was tied to grant funding and disaster 
reimbursement. In the sense of grant funding for equipment and training, implementation 
was a potentially funded mandate. However, the mandate was included as part of a larger 
goal, preparedness for disasters and catastrophic incidents. Local jurisdictions, who in 
many cases were struggling to make ends meet for day-to-day needs, became subject to 
an unproven policy. Many jurisdictions signed on the line to verify system 
implementation, but in reality, they implemented only the portions of the system that 
applied to them. Despite the enforcement authority the federal government may have in 
such situations, the end result in a wide array of jurisdictions is that NIMS and ICS will 
not be implemented as written. An oft heard saying in the homeland security enterprise is 
that disasters start local and end local. Every citizen is part of a local jurisdiction first. 
Citizens empower elected officials and bureaucrats to protect them from harm (U.S. 
Const., Preamble). Their first line of defense is their emergency response community. 
With this in mind, it is of the utmost importance that mandates aimed at controlling the 
activities of local responders are acceptable to those on who the mandates are imposed. 
3. Complexity 
In the history of the ICS, it is the author’s contention that NIMS/All-Hazard ICS 
was a normal accident—a hiccup in the history of an otherwise useful and smart system. 
The resultant policy has unknown effects on the effectiveness of system. By taking ICS, 
an arguably smart practice, and spreading it across the enterprise of homeland security, 
incident management presumably became more efficient. The result was a seemingly 
simple system with tremendous underlying complexities. In the context of this 
discussion, NIMS is an outcropping of a series of events that define a pattern in the realm 
of homeland security. One could view this as a normal accident, or a predictable and 
significant occurrence, in the life of ICS. With or without the policy of NIMS, the smart 
practice of ICS can stand on its own merits. The concepts within ICS are simplistic, but 
when they become part of the NIMS generalization, they become a precursor to unorder. 
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Hence, it is the goal of this thesis that any changes to NIMS and ICS should be based on 
reducing complexity. According to the findings of Bak et al. and Lewis, this requires 
reducing connectedness and increasing redundancy. 
4. Political Acceptability 
The concepts NIMS and ICS are entrenched in many administrative level 
bureaucratic personnel—the personnel who will have to be convinced to make changes. It 
is quite possible, that in many cases, NIMS and ICS are seen as near flawless policy. 
Further, many may have the attitude that the state and local jurisdictions must abide by 
NIMS without question. Acceptability to those who have a vested ownership in NIMS, 
have to rewrite local policies, and the NIC may not be so great. These recommendations 
may well fly in the face of the standardization that some would wish to achieve through 
NIMS. 
5. Cost 
In any policy effort, cost is a consideration. The printing and distribution of 
materials would be of some cost, but not substantial when considering it will affect an 
entire nation. Cost in this case is relative to the original cost of NIMS Implementation. In 
the fiscal years 2002 through 2011, the federal government appropriated over $37 billion 
to the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) preparedness grant programs (GAO, 
2012, p. 1). These programs were intended to “enhance the capabilities of state and local 
governments to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks 
(GAO, 2012, p. 1). With this in mind, any efforts to implement revisions to ensure the 
success of an existing program would pale in comparison. 
B. COMPARISON OF POLICY OPTIONS 























A High High Low Low Medium Low 
B High High Low Low Medium Low 
C Medium Medium Medium Low Low Low 
 
C. OUTCOMES OF POLICY OPTIONS 
1. Policy Option A—Acknowledging the Bottom-Up Response When 
Implementing ICS? 
Policy Option A—Acknowledge the bottom-up response that occurs when 
implementing ICS at major incidents: Modify ICS and NIMS training and 
implementation to change the ethos of ICS from a top-down system to a bottom-up 
system during the initial stages of a major incident. Emphasize the importance of the 
phase of major incidents that begins with its occurrence and ends with the beginning of 
the first operational period. 
This recommendation would result in greater support to initial responders of 
catastrophic events. Supporting the initial response is the bridge to sense-making in the 
chaos of a disaster. The first responders are seeing the needs and taking care of 
immediate priorities. ICS is intended to orchestrate the initial response while, in a parallel 
fashion, conducting damage assessments and planning for the first and subsequent 
operational periods. Changing to a bottom-up mentality in the initial stages would allow 
for the natural, self-organizing nature of disasters and catastrophic incidents to assist 
rather than hinder the IC/UC. The potential trade-off is the “loss of control” that may be 
felt by some. This recommendation, however, is not supporting a free-for-all. Rather, it is 
suggesting supporting the initial efforts of responders while at the same time, layering in 
a command structure for the sustained response. 
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2. Policy Option B—Flexibility in ICS: Emphasize Individuality and 
Locality 
Policy Option B—Emphasize the ethos of flexibility in ICS application, 
considering the concepts of individuality and locality in incident response frameworks. 
A revision to the ICS educational materials emphasizing flexibility would be a 
major shift. The key end result would be a shift from militaristic implementation and to 
focusing on the needs of the incident and responders. This recommendation does not 
suggest a wholesale disregard for the policies and standardization of ICS. Rather, it 
suggests that local and regional jurisdictions be encouraged to emphasize the portions of 
ICS that are most pertinent to their operations. This should be done through planning and 
agreement. Further, this recommendation suggests that when implementing ICS for an 
incident, the main consideration must be the needs of the incident not creating the perfect 
ICS chart. 
3. Policy Option C—Agency Designations 
Policy Option C—Distinguish between jurisdictional and other types of agencies 
in ICS Training and Implementation. Focus on the role of the Liaison Officer and the 
EOC role in relieving and reducing the burden of “All-Hazard” inclusiveness on the UC.  
First and foremost, this recommendation is unintentionally likely to make some 
people feel left out; however, we have been giving people the wrong impression. This 
impression is that all of the players will be equal when they arrive at the command post. 
In the midst of a disaster, key players in a UC will be those who have the resources and 
expertise to save lives and protect property. As the focus of the incident shifts, the 
construct of the UC will change. Many organizations have their own organizational plans 
and will interface with the Liaison Officer, or provide an agency representative in the 
EOC to ensure coordination with the UC. The intent is not to dis-include any 
organizations that are pertinent to the UC, rather it is to manage the ability of the UC to 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
In light of recent successes and failures in incident management, this research 
explores where the management failures lie between what obviously works and what 
does not. The importance of the research is measured in human life. If lives can be saved 
through identifying a management difference, then changes can be made to improve 
response. Finding that important seam is the ultimate goal of both this research and 
response leaders across the country. The research works at the strategic policy level to 
identify how systemic, rather than tactical alterations, can be made across the system in 
an effort to improve overall management. In particular, it considers the response phase of 
disasters and catastrophic incidents and asks, what can be done to help responders use the 
existing framework? What positive change can be made in the national ethos with regard 
to disaster and catastrophic incident management? And finally, what can be done to 
improve the acceptance and utility of known and proven management tools? 
Incidents at the national level are closely scrutinized, and mistakes and errors will 
be exposed. Where those management failures are linked to losses of life, demands will 
be made against both the failed managers and agencies, by other levels of government, 
citizen groups or even the courts. While some management failures are going to happen, 
those that can be changed through better policy should be critically considered and 
changed. Management is not a new subject and managing catastrophic incidents is a field 
of study that can be known through analysis.  
ICS refers to itself as a “top down” system of management where objectives are 
orchestrated by a traditional, scalar command structure. This thesis has shown that 
incident success is more likely when command personnel acknowledge the “bottom-up,” 
or self-organizing system that naturally occurs during the initial stages. Once 
commanders acknowledge this portion of the response, they can take it into account as 
part of their planning for the sustained response. It is the IC/UC’s job to support these 
efforts while developing an action plan for a sustained response. The first 
recommendation is to acknowledge the bottom-up response that occurs when 
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implementing ICS at major incidents and to modify ICS and NIMS training and 
implementation to change the ethos of ICS from a top-down system to a bottom-up 
system during the initial stages of a major incident. Emphasis should be placed on the 
importance of the phase of major incidents that begins with its occurrence and ends with 
the beginning of the first operational period  
This thesis examined the combined concepts of individuality and locality, as they 
apply to flexibility in ICS. It suggests there is a disconnect in the intent of incident 
management as a whole, and the current ethos and teachings surrounding ICS and NIMS. 
The second policy option, therefore, is to emphasize the ethos of flexibility in ICS 
application, considering the concepts of individuality and locality in incident response 
frameworks.  
Further, this document also examines the concept of inclusiveness when 
establishing a UC. One of the weaknesses of ICS in years past was that it was construed 
as a fire service system. With the implementation of NIMS and All-Hazard ICS, the 
pendulum has swung far to the side of inclusiveness in UC. The third policy option 
suggests distinguishing between jurisdictional and other types of agencies in ICS training 
and implementation. Focus on the role of the Liaison Officer and the EOC role in 
relieving and reducing the burden of all-hazard inclusiveness on the UC.  
Much debate surrounds the efficacy of ICS and NIMS to handle a comprehensive 
range of incidents. This thesis will not only contribute concrete solutions to improve the 
use of ICS, but also add to the academic literature on the topic. This research is an effort 
to apply appropriate analysis to three aspects of a current policy, NIMS, in an attempt to 
reduce complexity and increase understanding. The thesis uses a policy analysis to 
develop strategic recommendations aimed at increasing 1) the utility of ICS to the 
homeland security enterprise, and 2) its palatability to local jurisdictions. The goal is to 
prevent the consequences of management failures that can occur from disasters and 
catastrophic incidents. The recommendations in this thesis are not mutually exclusive. 
The ideal situation would be to implement all of the recommendations set forth in the 
thesis. However, any of them will have positive impact. The combined results of these 
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actions would greatly improve implementation and bring ICS practitioners into line with 
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APPENDIX A.  PARTIAL LIST OF ICS/NIMS COURSES 
ICS-100: Introduction to the Incident Command System 
ICS-200: ICS for Single Resources and Initial Action Incidents 
ICS-300: Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents 
ICS-400: Advanced ICS 
IS-700: National Incident Management System, An Introduction 
IS-701: NIMS Multiagency Coordination System (MACS) 
IS-702: NIMS Publication Information Systems 
IS-703: NIMS Resource Management 
IS-704: NIMS Communication and Information Management 
IS-706: NIMS Intrastate Mutual Aid – An Introduction 
IS-800: National Response Framework, An Introduction 
E/L 950: All-Hazards Position Specific Incident Commander 
E/L 952: All-Hazards Position Specific Public Information Officer 
E/L 954: All-Hazards Position Specific Safety Officer 
E/L 956: All-Hazards Position Specific Liaison Officer 
E/L 958: All-Hazards Position Specific Operations Section Chief  
E/L 960: All-Hazards Position Specific Division/Group Supervisor 
E/L 962: All-Hazards Position Specific Planning Section Chief 
E/L 964: All-Hazards Position Specific Situation Unit Leader 
E/L 965: All-Hazards Position Specific Resources Unit Leader 
E/L 967: All-Hazards Position Specific Logistics Section Chief 
E/L 969: All-Hazards Position Specific Communications Unit Leader 
E/L 970: All-Hazards Position Specific Supply Unit Leader 
E/L 971: All-Hazards Position Specific Facilities Unit Leader 
E/L 973: All-Hazards Position Specific Finance/Admin. Section Chief 
E/L 975: All-Hazards Position Specific Finance/Admin. Unit Leader Course 
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